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JURISDICTION 
This matter was transferred to the Court of Appeals by the Utah Supreme Court 
pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-2(4). This Court has Jurisdiction to decide 
appellants' appeal pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-2(3)0). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Issue: Did the trial court err when it granted Smith's motion for summary 
judgment? 
Standard of Review: "Because summary judgment is granted as a 
matter of law rather than fact, the appellate court is free to reappraise the trial court's 
legal conclusions. The appellate court reviews those conclusions for correctness, 
without according deference to the trial court." Brown v. Weis, 871 P.2d 552, 559 (Utah 
App. 1994) (citations omitted). 
2. Issue: Did the trial court err when it ordered, as a matter of law, the ASC 
Utah, Inc. funds that had been attached pursuant to a writ of garnishment issued on the 
original, reversed judgment, released to Smith? 
Standard of Review: "Because summary judgment is granted as a 
matter of law rather than fact, the appellate court is free to reappraise the trial court's 
legal conclusions. The appellate court reviews those conclusions for correctness, 
without according deference to the trial court." Id. 
APPLICABLE STATUTES AND RULES 
UTAH R. CIV. P. 56, Summary judgment. See Addendum 2. 
UTAH R. CIV. P. 64D(i), Garnishment. See Addendum 3. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
The issue of the validity of a 1966 contract between D. A. Osguthorpe and the 
decedent, Enoch Smith, Jr., was resolved in Smith v. Osguthorpe, 2002 UT App. 361, U 
32, 58 P.3d 854 (hereinafter "Smith /"), in which this Court affirmed the trial court's grant 
of summary judgment that the 1966 agreement between Plaintiffs decedent, Enoch 
Smith, Jr., and defendant, D. A. Osguthorpe, was valid, and applicable to the proceeds 
of any agreements to sell or lease certain real property owned by D. A. Osguthorpe, or 
his successors. See id., U 53, 58 P.3d at 865. This Court reversed the trial court's 
summary judgment on damages, however. See id. This Court remanded for a 
determination, of whether an agreement between ASC Utah, Inc., on the one hand, and 
the defendants and non-party Stephen A. Osguthorpe, on the other hand, for the use of 
a portion of the real property and provision of personal services was intended by the 
parties to be integrated. See id. fl 45, 58 P.3d at 863-64. This Court stated: "We 
therefore remand for the court to consider the parol evidence or to make clear that it 
considered the parol evidence in ruling that the lease and the amendments are 
integrated." id. 
On remand, Plaintiff Enoch Richard Smith (hereinafter "Smith"), the personal 
representative of the estate of Enoch Smith, Jr., immediately renewed his motion for 
summary judgment, without supporting the motion with any statement of facts, 
supported by citation to the record. See Motion for Summary Judgment, dated March 
29, 2003 (R. 1131-1134); Memorandum In Support of Motion for Summary Judgment; 
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(R. 1135-1146); Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary 
Judgment (R. 1149-1169). The trial court granted summary judgment on damages on 
the renewed motion, based strictly on the trial court's statement that it had previously 
considered parol evidence and, without any new evidence, dramatically increased the 
judgment. 
Defendants moved under Rule 54(b) to revisit or clarify the Memorandum 
Decision (Motion, R. 1209-10, Memorandum in Support, R. 1211-21), in part based on 
the argument that this Court must have intended in its remand to follow the Utah 
Supreme Court's admonition in the case of Platts v. Parents Helping Parents dba 
Turnabout, 947 P.2d 658, 663 (Utah 1997), that a remand to the trial court on an 
unclear summary judgment record should require "the trial court to set out an adequate 
basis of undisputed facts to justify its grant of summary judgment or, if necessary, to 
hold further proceedings to make adequate factual determinations." Id. The trial court 
denied that motion and refused to explain what undisputed facts existed on which it 
could base a summary judgment, especially one that is several hundred thousand 
dollars higher than the original judgment. 
Further, the trial court held over $200,000.00 that had been attached pursuant to 
a writ of garnishment issued upon the original judgment that this Court reversed. 
Rather than release those funds upon this Court's reversal to ASC Utah, Inc., the 
garnishee, and without any writ issued on the second judgment or proceedings thereon, 
the trial court purported to resolve disputed factual issues as a matter of law and 
ordered the funds paid to Smith. 
This appeal therefore challenges the correctness of the entry of summary 
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judgment on damages, as well as the correctness of the garnishee order that the funds 
held by the court upon the writ of garnishment issued on the first judgment that was 
reversed, be released to Smith. 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
Following the original judgment herein entered by the trial court, a writ of 
garnishment was issued to ASC Utah, Inc., and, in the course of garnishment 
proceedings upon that writ, $200,000 was paid into the court. Before final action was 
taken to release those funds from the trial court, this Court reversed the original 
judgment with respect to damages and remanded for further proceedings. 
C. Disposition By Trial Court. 
Smith filed a motion for summary judgment upon remand. The trial court again 
granted summary judgment for Smith (increasing the damages award by several 
hundred thousand dollars over the original judgment, without receiving any evidence) 
and, without a writ issued on such second judgment, or other process to determine 
ownership of the previously attached funds, ordered them released to Smith on the 
same day that it entered the second summary judgment on damages. This appeal from 
the post-remand summary judgment and the final order on the garnishment issued 
under the first, reversed, judgment ensued. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Prior to 1959, D. A. Osguthorpe, individually, operated a sheep and cattle 
business. As part of that business, D. A. Osguthorpe was the owner of and grazed his 
sheep and cattle over real property, part of which is the subject of this action. June 21, 
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1999 Affidavit of D. A. Osguthorpe at H 2 (R. 116); April 21, 2000 Affidavit of D. A. 
Osguthorpe atf l 1 (R. 258). 
2. In approximately 1959, Enoch Smith, Jr.1 and D. A. Osguthorpe formed a 
partnership, by oral agreement, for the purpose of operating a sheep and cattle 
business (the "Oral Partnership"). Id. atf l 3 (R. 117). 
3. Prior to the formation of the Oral Partnership, D. A. Osguthorpe owned 
fee title to all of the subject real estate. Id. at H 4 (R. 117). 
4. Subsequent to D. A. Osguthorpe's payment of $50,000.00 cash to Smith 
for Smith's partnership interest, D. A. Osguthorpe was informed by O. W. Moyle, Jr. of 
the law firm of Moyle & Draper, that Smith desired that D. A. Osguthorpe sign a 
document to memorialize the agreement relating to the dissolution of the Oral 
Partnership pursuant to the Oral Dissolution Agreement. At that time, Mr. Moyle 
presented D. A. Osguthorpe with a draft copy of a document (the "1966 Document"). D. 
A. Osguthorpe was informed by Mr. Moyle that the 1966 Document had been drafted 
by Mr. Moyle at the request of Smith. June 21,1999 Affidavit of D. A. Osguthorpe at fl 
6 (R. 117-118). This Court previously held the 1966 Document to be a valid and 
enforceable dissolution agreement in Smith I. 
5. Some thirty years following the dissolution agreement, in 1996, Ken 
Griswold, the manager of Wolf Mountain Resort, contacted D. A. Osguthorpe about 
entering into an agreement by which D. A. Osguthorpe and Stephen Osguthorpe would 
(1) help Wolf Mountain get approval and permits from Summit County , and 
1
 "Smith," as used herein, refers to both decedent and, where the context 
requires, his personal representative. 
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concessions from adjoining landowners; (2) help in dealings with the County 
Commissioners, the zoning and planning commissions; and D. A. Osguthorpe would (3) 
allow the use of a part of the high country land owned by D. A. Osguthorpe and D. A. 
Osguthorpe Family Partnership, for limited purposes at limited times of year. See 
Deposition of D. A. Osguthorpe at 68:5-72:15 (R. 959). Wolf Mountain Resort 
specifically was interested in exploiting the rapport that the Osguthorpes, and 
particularly Stephen Osguthorpe, had with various government officials and community 
leaders who could be helpful to the resort. See Deposition of D. A. Osguthorpe at 
73:12 - 82:24 (R. 959). 
6. An agreement was negotiated between Wolf Mountain Resort, D. A. 
Osguthorpe, The D. A. Osguthorpe Family Partnership and Stephen Osguthorpe, 
requiring an annual pre-payment of $100,000 to keep the Osguthorpes on retainer to 
deal on behalf of Wolf Mountain with county officers and land owners, requiring 
Stephen Osguthorpe to provide advice and other services, and requiring D. A. 
Osguthorpe to allow the use of a small portion of his land at times, for part of a ski run 
and for lift towers. Id. A document was executed memorializing that small part of the 
entire agreement that dealt with the use of the land, strictly to allow Wolf Mountain 
Resort to record its limited property rights that resulted from that agreement. See 
Affidavit of Stephen Osguthorpe, ffi| 3-4 (R. 750). Stephen Osguthorpe, individually, 
was a party to the entire agreement, but did not sign the written document concerning 
the real estate because he was not an owner of the real estate. Id. It was not 
intended either by any of the Osguthorpe parties or Wolf Mountain that the document 
would be an integration and, indeed, the document, which consists of approximately 
6 
one-half page describing the property involved, together with a drawing as an exhibit, 
contains no integration clause. Id. and Exhibit "A" to the Affidavit of Stephen 
Osguthorpe (R. 755-56). 
7. Wolf Mountain Resort was subsequently purchased by ASC Utah, Inc., in 
July 1997. See Affidavit of Blaise Carrig at 1J 2 (R. 762). Mr. Blaise Carrig was the 
managing director of ASC Utah as of July 3, 1997, when it took over the resort, and was 
the president of ASC Utah, Inc. from 1999 through all material times in this litigation. Id. 
at H1 (R. 761). 
8. When ASC Utah, Inc. took over Wolf Mountain Resorts, it acquired all of 
Wolf Mountain's rights and obligations under the agreement between Wolf Mountain 
and the Osguthorpes. See Affidavit of Blaise Carrig, at U 3 (R. 762). ASC Utah, Inc. 
understood that the agreement included an obligation for it to pre-pay $100,000 each 
year for future personal services rendered by D. A. Osguthorpe and Stephen 
Osguthorpe "which were critical to the success of the master planning and permit 
approval process for The Canyons." Id. at U 4 (R. 762). 
9. On July 28, 1997, Les Otten, the then-president of American Skiing 
Company, the parent company of ASC Utah, Inc., and Blaise Carrig, met with D. A. 
Osguthorpe and Stephen Osguthorpe in a sheep meadow to discuss modifications to 
the original Wolf Mountain agreement. See id. at H 5 (R. 762-63). 
10. ASC Utah, Inc. specifically asked Stephen Osguthorpe, individually, to 
continue to assist it with the approval process for its expansion and to provide day-to-
day consultation on land use, planning and environmental issues, as well as to allow it 
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to utilize Stephen Osguthorpe's community and political rapport for the agreement's 
entire term. See id. On that date, ASC Utah, Inc. agreed to increase the annual pre-
payment to $150,000 in recognition of additional services it was requesting, as well as 
the expanded use of real property. See id. 
11. At the conclusion of that negotiation in the sheep meadow, Mr. Carrig 
drafted an amendment to the original agreement, attached to his affidavit as Exhibit B, 
which, again, contained no integration clause and which expressly named Stephen A. 
Osguthorpe as a party. (R. 769-770). 
12. The requirement that the Osguthorpes, and particularly Stephen 
Osguthorpe, be on retainer to provide such requested services to allow exploitation of 
his rapport with government and community leaders and neighbors, to the exclusive 
benefit of ASC Utah, Inc., was to last twenty-eight years. See Deposition of Blaine 
Carrig, at 45:17 - 48:25 (R. 958). See also Deposition of D. A. Osguthorpe, at 81:8 -
82:24; 92:20-25 (R. 959). 
13. Because of the time constraints and the unique nature of ASC Utah, Inc.'s 
relationship with the Osguthorpes, the amendment drafted by Mr. Carrig was very brief 
and did not include a detailed description of all of the personal services to be provided 
by the Osguthorpes in consideration for the annual pre-payment of $150,000. Instead it 
referred to the parties' obligations (including the obligation of Stephen Osguthorpe) to 
work together in good faith and maintain open communication. ASC Utah, Inc. never 
intended the amendment to be a complete recitation of all the services to be provided 
by Stephen Osguthorpe in consideration for the annual pre-payment. See Affidavit of 
Blaise Carrig at U 6 (R. 763). 
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14. A further amendment was drafted by Mr. Carrig after a meeting with D. A. 
Osguthorpe and Stephen Osguthorpe, and signed August 10,1998, again with no 
integration clause. See Affidavit of Blaise Carrig at H 7 (R. 763-64, 771-72). 
15. Once Mr. Carrig began negotiating the amendments on behalf of ASC 
Utah, Inc., Stephen Osguthorpe was specifically included as a signing party on the 
agreements. See Exhibits B and C to the Affidavit of Blaise Carrig (R. 769-72). 
16. On May 13,1998, D. A. Osguthorpe signed a Special Warranty Deed to 
transfer the property at issue (and more) to D. A. Osguthorpe, Trustee of the Dr. D. A. 
Osguthorpe Trust, which deed was delivered and recorded August 20, 1998 in the 
office of the Summit County Recorder (R. 544-546). 
17. This action was filed two and one-half months subsequent to that 
transfer, on November 6, 1998, yet does not name as a defendant D. A. Osguthorpe in 
his capacity as Trustee of the Dr. D. A. Osguthorpe Family Trust, even though the 
Trust, as of August 20, 1998, became entitled to any portion of the 1999 pre-payment 
for use of its real estate. See Complaint (R. 1-14). The Complaint also fails to name 
Stephen A. Osguthorpe or ASC Utah, Inc., even though Smith has sought to interpret 
their rights and obligations under the Agreement. See id. 
18. The original agreement between Wolf Mountain, D. A. Osguthorpe, 
Osguthorpe Family Partnership and Stephen Osguthorpe, and as later amended by 
ASC Utah, Inc., was intended by each of the parties thereto to provide a single annual 
pre-payment in exchange both for the use of real property and the provision of services 
to Wolf Mountain and, later, ASC Utah. Affidavit of Blaise Carrig, at U 4 (R. 762). The 
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Osguthorpes in fact performed each year by providing services in exchange for the 
annual payment. See Deposition of Blaise Carrig at 17:25 - 22:22 (R. 958). 
19. In fact, the agreement to increase the amount of compensation under the 
agreements was specifically made, in part, largely due to the agreement to provide 
additional services. Affidavit of Blaise Carrig, at ffll 5-7 (R. 762-63). 
20. ASC Utah never intended the written documents to be a complete 
recitation of all of the services to be provided by the Osguthorpes in consideration for 
the single, annual payment. Id. The reason all the terms and conditions of the 
agreement for use of real property and services in exchange for a single annual 
payment were not included in the written document was because the Osguthorpes and 
ASC Utah trusted each other and they "both understood what [the full agreement] was." 
Blaise Carrig Deposition at 55:14-15, 64:9-65:25 (R. 958). 
21. Blaise Carrig testified that "we just felt that in a whole that this was the 
arrangement. And we never had a reason to separate the value of one piece from 
another. One of the pieces of value is that we didn't think that the land without the 
support in order to get the permits and the continued, ongoing planning and 
consultation to make the whole operation and planning piece work, that the land use 
was basically worthless if we didn't get the whole plan to be successful." Blaise Carrig 
Deposition at 38:21 - 39:4 (R. 958). Blaise Carrig also testified that a reference in the 
written document was specifically intended to be a reference to the required services in 
exchange for the single annual payment. Blaise Carrig Deposition at 31:15-23 (R. 958). 
22. Further, Blaise Carrig, the president of ASC Utah, Inc., testified in his 
deposition that the parties to the agreement intended the annual payment due to be 
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paid in consideration of both the use of land and also services to be rendered by D. A. 
Osguthorpe and Stephen Osguthorpe. Deposition of Blaise Carrig, at 40:3-12 (R. 958). 
23. The specific reference to the Osguthorpes' participating in the master 
planning process was meant to be a reference to the services that the Osguthorpes 
were to provide under the only agreement they had with ASC Utah, Inc., in exchange 
for the single pre-payment. Affidavit of Blaise Carrig, at fflj 5-6 (R. 962-63). Blaise 
Carrig further testified in his affidavit: "ASCII has not attempted to allocate the annual 
payment between payment for use of the real property and payment for the personal 
services rendered by the Osguthorpes. There has never been any need for such an 
allocation because the parties clearly intended the annual payment to include payment 
for both use of the real property and personal services." Affidavit of Blaise Carrig, at H 8 
(R. 764). 
24. Stephen Osguthorpe, in his affidavit, also makes clear that was his intent 
in entering into the agreement: "That agreement was for a single payment for both real 
estate and services. The real estate interest was formalized in a document, but not the 
services, even though the payment was for both. Affidavit of Stephen Osguthorpe, j[ 3 
(R. 750). Stephen Osguthorpe further testified: "At no time was it ever intended by the 
family partnership or me in the negotiations that the payments referenced in the 
document were solely for property." Affidavit of Stephen Osguthorpe, fl 4 (R. 750-51). 
Moreover, Stephen Osguthorpe testified: 
To the contrary, the express intent of the parties in the negotiation 
was that the written agreement would be signed only to allow it to 
be recorded to protect any property rights that Wolf Mountain had 
in the use of the property, but that the document did not contain all 
of the terms and conditions of the agreement and was not intended 
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to contain all the terms and conditions of the agreement or to be an 
integrated document concerning the agreement. Instead, the 
agreement provided that the payment was also for the provision of 
services to be provided by my father and me to Wolf Mountain and, 
from the date of that agreement forward, my father and I each 
provided services to Wolf Mountain. 
Affidavit of Stephen Osguthorpe at U 4 (R. 750-51). 
25. With respect to the July 28,1997 amendment, Stephen Osguthorpe again 
testified: 
However, at no time did I intend on behalf of myself individually, or 
the family partnership, to have that document represent the entirety 
of all the terms and conditions of the agreement. To the contrary, 
my intent was that the document would not reflect all the terms and 
conditions of the agreement, because the agreement was far 
broader than what we placed into the document. 
Affidavit of Stephen Osguthorpe at U 6 (R. 751). 
26. Stephen Osguthorpe likewise testified with respect to the August 10,1998 
amendment: 
However, once again, there was never any intention on my part, 
either individually or on behalf of the family partnership, that such 
document would represent the entire agreement and, in fact, it did 
not, although it more clearly referenced the planning services I 
provided and was to provide. It was used solely as a tool to protect 
The Canyons' interest in real estate, but was not an integration of 
the agreement and understanding between The Canyons, on the 
one hand, and D. A. Osguthorpe, the family partnership and me, on 
the other hand. It was intended and all parties understood that the 
agreement was much broader and that my father, the family 
partnership and I, and primarily me, would provide services to The 
Canyons in exchange for the payment every year from The 
Canyons. 
Affidavit of Stephen A. Osguthorpe, U 7 (R. 751-52). 
27. The price term for both the use of real property and services, combined, 
was clearly agreed for each year as a single dollar amount. Affidavit of Stephen A. 
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Osguthorpe at If 9 (R. 752-53). 
28. Each year Stephen A. Osguthorpe and his father have provided services 
required in exchange for the payment. Affidavit of Stephen A. Osguthorpe, U 4 (R. 
750-51). 
29. Smith has offered no evidence into the record of any kind, at any time, to 
controvert the testimony of all the parties to this arms-length transaction concerning the 
single agreement and single payment for both use of real estate and for provision of 
services. Nor has Smith, at any time, produced any evidence into the record to 
controvert testimony concerning the services that were provided to Wolf Mountain 
Resorts and ASC Utah under the terms of the agreement. See Record, passim. 
30. The original judgment was entered herein on June 8, 2001. See 
Judgment (R. 799-800). 
31. On June 29, 2001, Smith applied for issuance under that judgment of a 
writ of Garnishment to ASC Utah, Inc. See Application for Writ of Garnishment (R. 
814-15). 
32. ASC Utah, Inc. filed garnishee answers to interrogatories, describing the 
nature of its ostensible indebtedness as derived from its agreements, not only with 
defendants, but also with non-party Stephen A. Osguthorpe. See Garnishee Answers 
to Interrogatories (R. 845-46). 
33. Defendants requested a hearing on the garnishment (R. 858-59). 
Defendants also filed a traversal to the garnishee answers to interrogatories, asserting, 
inter alia, that some portion of the pre-payments would be payable to non-party 
Stephen A. Osguthorpe, individually, by ASC Utah, Inc., and not them, and were 
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therefore not subject to garnishment. See Reply to Answers of Garnishees (R. 865-66). 
34. At the time the writ of garnishment was served, there was in fact no 
amount currently due from ASC Utah, Inc. as to any person because, under the terms 
of the agreement and generally accepted accounting principles, the payments were pre-
payments for the use of real estate and services to be provided in the future, and they 
were not debt. See Affidavit of Ray S. Ellison, CPA (R. 872-78). 
35. The trial court refused to hold an evidentiary hearing, essentially granting 
summary judgment against defendants on their traversal of garnishment, and overruled 
defendants' objection that non-party Stephen A. Osguthorpe was a necessary party and 
determined, regardless of what work non-party Stephen A. Osguthorpe might be 
required to perform in the future year, that all of the money to be paid from ASC Utah, 
Inc. was attachable to pay the judgment. See Memorandum Decision (R. 949-53). 
36. Stephen A. Osguthorpe had threatened ASC Utah with suit if it did not pay 
him for services to be rendered by him in the future, which dispute was settled by entry 
into a Restatement of Agreement, dated August 1, 2001 (R. 935-47). Under the 
Restatement of Agreement, there was an acknowledgment of Stephen A. Osguthorpe's 
individual right to receive payment for services he was to provide, individually, and 
allocation of the annual pre-payment between use of real estate and services. See id. 
37. Further, the question of the fair market value of the annual use of the 
Trust's real estate by ASC Utah, Inc. each year, with respect to what portion of the 
annual payment was to be assigned to that use, was to be resolved by the mechanism 
of each side of the transaction hiring independent and qualified real estate appraisers to 
appraise the fair market value of the actual annual use. See Restatement of 
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Agreement, fl 4.1 (R. 940) (mandating each side of the contract hire a real estate 
appraiser with no less than ten years experience to come up with an independent fair 
market value for the annual easement, which appraisal shall be averaged to 
established the amount of consideration to be allocated as payment for the easement 
on an annual basis). 
38. The fair market value of the actual use of the small portion of the Trust's 
real property actually used by ASC Utah, Inc., determined under the Restatement of 
Agreement by the average of the independent appraisals, is the sum of $3,275.50. See 
Plaintiffs Memorandum in Response to Defendants' Motion to Revisit and/or Clarify the 
Court's July 8, 2003 Memorandum Decision and Objection to Form of Judgment, at 6 
(R. 1239); Defendants' Memorandum in Their Motion to Revisit and/or Clarify the 
Court's July 8, 2003 Memorandum Decision and Objection to Form of Judgment, at 10, 
R. 1220); Garnishee Answers to Interrogatories, Answer to Interrogatory No. 3, dated 
November 19, 2003 (R. 1288). 
39. The original judgment was reversed by this Court as to damages on 
October 31, 2002. See Smith I. 
40. After that reversal, the trial court entered its order releasing the funds 
attached by the writ, not to the garnishee ASC Utah, Inc., but rather to Smith. (R. 1260-
61). 
41. The Summary Judgment subject of this appeal is several hundred 
thousand dollars higher than the original judgment, although no facts justifying such an 
increased award were set forth in the motion or supporting memorandum. See 
Judgment (R. 1262-63), Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 
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1135-46). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
When the trial court entered summary judgment on Smith's renewed motion after 
remand, it committed the following errors: 
1. The trial court granted relief that is at variance from the relief Smith sought 
in his complaint, that sought "an order directing the Osguthorpes to account to Smith for 
all monies received by them from a lease or leases and any amendments thereto of the 
property described in the Agreement and for judgment for amounts found to be owing to 
Smith, together with interest thereon as provided by law." See Complaint, Prayer for 
Relief, U 1 (R. 5). The trial court never ordered any accounting of monies received by 
defendants and simply entered judgment based upon payments made by ASC Utah, 
Inc., regardless of the payee, despite the fact that the real property had been 
transferred prior to the litigation (or notice of any claim) to a non-party, despite the fact 
that part of the payment was for services rendered, rather than use of the real estate, 
and despite the fact that the fair market value for the use of the real property, to the 
extent and in the manner used by ASC Utah, Inc. is less than four thousand dollars per 
year. 
2. Smith had not properly supported his motion by setting forth allegedly 
uncontested facts supported by portions of the record relied upon, yet the trial court 
allowed Smith to proceed in that manner, thereby denying defendants due process of 
law. 
3. The trial court failed to support its ruling by explaining it; and 
4. The trial court awarded additional sums, beyond the original judgment, 
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with no evidence that any payments in fact were received by defendants. 
5. The trial court ignored facts in the record that create genuine issues of 
material fact precluding summary judgment. 
Those facts include: (1) Testimony from parties on both sides of the arms-length 
contract, to the effect that the documents executed by ASC Utah, Inc. and the 
Osguthorpes were not intended to be integrations; (2) testimony from both sides of the 
arms-length agreements that only a portion of each single, annual pre-payment was for 
the use of real estate and the major portion was for provision of services and access to 
Stephen Osguthorpe's connections with local community leaders that have value to 
ASC Utah, Inc.; (3) the documents contain no integration clauses; (4) the fair market 
value of the actual use of the real estate each year is less than $4,000.; and (5) the 
Restatement of Agreement allocates $3,275.50 per year for use of the real estate. 
The trial court committed error in its final order on the garnishment proceedings 
based upon the original judgment, by releasing the escrowed funds to Smith, for the 
following reasons: (1) When the original judgment was reversed, the original writ 
became a nullity, so the trial court had no more jurisdiction over the funds and should 
have returned them to the garnishee, ASC Utah, Inc.; (2) the trial court's failure to hold 
an evidentiary hearing on defendants' defense that Stephen A. Osguthorpe was the 
owner of the funds constituted a denial of due process. 
ARGUMENT 
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW. 
This case is before this Court for review of the entry of summary judgment in 
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favor of Smith and against D. A. Osguthorpe and the Osguthorpe Family Partnership, 
on damages. "On a motion for summary judgment, the moving party [here, Smith] 
bears the burden of proof for its motion, namely, the burden of proving that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law." Jensen v. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 944 P.2d 327, 329 (Utah 1997) (on 
rehearing). 
"A trial court's grant or denial of summary judgment is reviewed for correctness." 
Snow v. Rudd, 998 P.2d 262, 265, 2000 UT 20, U 9. "Summary judgment is 
appropriate only when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." SME Industries, Inc. v. Thompson, 
Ventulett, Stainback, and Assoc, Inc., 28 P.3d 669, 673, 2001 UT 54, H 9 (citing UTAH 
R. Civ. P. 56(C)). "Doubts, uncertainties or inferences concerning issues of fact must be 
construed in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. 
Litigants must be able to present their cases fully to the court before judgment can be 
rendered against them unless it is obvious from the evidence before the court that the 
party opposing judgment can establish no right to recovery. The trial court must not 
weigh evidence or assess credibility." Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. 
Atkin, Wright & Miles, Chartered, 681 P.2d 1258,1261 (Utah 1984) (footnotes omitted). 
II. GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT PRECLUDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST 
DEFENDANTS ON THE ISSUE OF DAMAGES. 
The trial court ruled, on the issue of damages, that the entire annual prepayment 
under the ASC Utah, Inc. agreement was exclusively for use of real property, and not 
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for services. (R. 606-07, 952.) Necessarily, the trial court ruled that the entire payment 
each year was made only to, and received by, defendants in this case, D. A. 
Osguthorpe, individually, and the D. A. Osguthorpe Family Partnership, jointly, even 
though the non-party, Dr. D. A. Osguthorpe Trust, has been the owner of the real estate 
since August 20, 1998, three months before Smith ever filed suit. The trial court 
entered this ruling despite the testimony of all parties to the ASC Utah, Inc. agreement 
that the single, annual prepayment was for both use of real estate and for services. 
The parties to the ASC Utah, Inc. agreement were unanimous in their affidavits and 
deposition testimony that the writings were not intended as integrations. Because only 
that portion of the payment attributable to the value of the use of the real estate and 
actually received by defendants or either of them, would be able to be considered in 
calculating damages against the existing defendants, genuine issues of material fact 
concerning that allocation and the quantification of the actual receipt of funds by each 
defendant precluded the summary judgment in favor of Smith that the trial court 
entered. 
A. The Determination Of Whether A Written Agreement Was Intended To 
Be An Integration Is A Factual Question; The Sworn Statements 
Raise A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact On The Question Of Whether 
The Documents Were Intended To Be Integrations. 
There is no question, under Utah law, that the determination of whether a 
document was intended to be an integration is a question of fact, not law. In Tates, Inc. 
v. Salisbury, 795 P.2d 1140 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), this Court succinctly stated this point: 
Whether a particular expression is an integration of the contract is 
a question of fact, and evidence both within and without the 
claimed integration is admissible to determine whether it is indeed 
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an integration. 
Id. at 1142. Smith argued that the documents executed by the Osguthorpes, on the 
one hand, and ASC Utah, Inc., on the other hand, were intended, by each of them, to 
be integrations. Yet Smith offered no factual evidence from any party, on either side of 
those agreements, that they had such intent. 
Nor do the agreements, themselves, contain integration clauses, and the 
abbreviated nature of the documents belies any such intent. Instead, the sworn 
statements from D. A. Osguthorpe and Stephen A. Osguthorpe, on the Osguthorpe side 
of the transaction, and Blaise Carrig, the managing director and president of ASC Utah, 
Inc., on ASC Utah, Inc.'s side of the transaction, and the person who drafted the 
second and third amendments, each state that they did not intend the documents to be 
a full and complete representation of the entire agreement between them. 
In Apache Tanklines, Inc. v. Cheney, 706 P.2d 614 (Utah 1985), the Utah 
Supreme Court held that "[a] single sworn statement is sufficient to create an issue of 
fact. Clearly, it is not for a court to weigh the evidence or assess credibility." Id. at 616 
(quoting Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170 (Utah 1983)). Here, the sworn statements from 
parties on both sides of the arms-length contract, that the services portion was not fully 
explained in the documents, but was intended as part of the contract for the one annual 
payment, raises an issue of material fact. That precludes a ruling on summary 
judgment, as a matter of law, that the documents were intended to be an integration. 
Further, in reviewing a summary judgment, this Court is required to "view the 
facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to" the 
defendants. Arredondo v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 2001 UT 29, H 2, 24 P.3d 928, 
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929. The testimony is unequivocal that the Osguthorpes, and especially non-party-to-
the-litigation Stephen A. Osguthorpe, have in fact provided services to ASC Utah, Inc. 
under the agreement whenever ASC Utah, Inc. desired. The reasonable inference from 
that fact is that the documents were not intended to be integrations because the parties, 
themselves, were behaving as though the provision of services by Stephen A. 
Osguthorpe was part of the agreement for which he would be paid. See Be v. St. 
Benedict's Hospital, 638 P.2d 1190,1195 (Utah 1981): 
[T]he course of dealing of the parties gives some indication of their 
intentions.... Though arguably clear on its face, where the parties 
demonstrate by their actions that to them the contract meant 
something quite different, the intent of the parties will be enforced. 
Id. 
Moreover, the absence of any integration clause in the documents, themselves, 
provides a reasonable inference that the parties did not intend the documents to be 
integrations. See Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth. v. United States, 129 F.3d 1226, 
1236 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (absence of integration clause leaves factual question about 
completeness and finality); accord American Security Bank, N.A. v. York, 1992 WL 
237375 (D.D.C.) (absence of integration clause is probative on question of parties' 
intent), copy attached as Addendum 4. 
The Osguthorpes and Wolf Mountain agreed on a single price to pay for both the 
use of real estate and services, that price being $100,000, due and payable in advance 
on August 12 of each year, and both sides of the arms-length agreement 
independently testified to that fact. See Affidavit of Stephen Osguthorpe, dated 
January 26, 2001 at fflj 3-8 (R. 749-760); Deposition of Blaise Carrig, R. 958 at 38:21-
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39:4 (R. 958). 
Commencing with the July 28,1997 modification, express reference is made in 
the writing to issues surrounding the provision of services. For example, in the July 28, 
1997 writing, Stephen Osguthorpe (not a party to this litigation), individually, is a named 
party to the agreement. Stephen Osguthorpe is expressly required, in paragraph 1 of 
that agreement, to "approve" the alignment of a road prior to construction. In ffl[ 2, 3 
and 4 of that writing, Stephen Osguthorpe is required to give approval for certain 
construction plans. The same is true in paragraph 8 of that agreement. In paragraph 9, 
the document specifically states: "[ASCII] will include the Osguthorpes in their master 
planning process." The agreement then concludes: "Both parties agree to work 
together in good faith and to maintain open communications. [ASCU] accepts the 
obligation to notice and seek approval from the Osguthorpes on any matters of change 
to their lands." 
In the August 10,1998 modification, the agreement, again expressly names 
Stephen Osguthorpe as a party. That writing again expressly states: "Both parties 
agree to work together in good faith and maintain open communication." Smith offers 
no explanation of how working together and approvals would be required if the 
documents simply dealt with the use of real property, as he contends. 
The Affidavit of Blaise Carrig, the president and managing director of ASC Utah, 
Inc., provides further evidence of the overall scope of services and requirements for the 
Osguthorpes to cooperate, as part of a single agreement. Mr. Carrig testifies in his 
affidavit: 
Although the Osguthorpe agreement [referencing the ASCU 
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agreement] specifically refers to the use of certain portions of the 
Osguthorpe's real property by Wolf Mountain in exchange for an 
annual payment of $100,000, it was my understanding from 
discussions with Kenneth Griswold, the managing member of Wolf 
Mountain, that the annual payment also included payment for 
personal services rendered by D. A. Osguthorpe and Stephen 
Osguthorpe which were critical to the success of the master 
planning and permit approval process for [ASCU]. 
Carrig Affidavit at fl4 (R. 762) (emphasis added). Mr. Carrig continued: 
On July 28,1997, Les Often, the president of American Skiing 
Company, the parent company of ASCU, and I met with D. A. 
Osguthorpe and Stephen Osguthorpe in a sheep meadow to 
discuss various issues related to the Osguthorpe agreement, 
including an expansion of the personal services provided by the 
Osguthorpes under the Osguthorpe agreement. Specifically, we 
asked Stephen Osguthorpe to continue to assist us with the 
approval process for The Canyons Spa and to provide day-to-day 
consultation on land use, planning and environmental issues as 
well as political and community relations. We also asked Stephen 
Osguthorpe to attend planning commission and county commission 
meetings on behalf of ASCU. ASCU agreed to increase the annual 
payment to $150,000 in consideration for the expanded use of the 
real property and the additional personal services to be provided by 
the Osguthorpes. 
At the conclusion of the discussion in the sheep meadow, we all 
shook hands and returned to my office where I drafted the 
amendment and clarification of the Osguthorpe agreement, which 
was signed by the parties that same afternoon ("Amendment"). 
Because of the time constraints and the unique nature of our 
relationship with the Osguthorpes, the Amendment is very brief and 
does not include a detailed description of all of the personal 
services to be provided by the Osguthorpes in consideration for the 
annual payment of $150,000. Instead, it refers to the parties' 
obligations to work together in good faith and maintain open 
communication. ASCU never intended the Amendment to be a 
complete recitation of all of the services to be provided by the 
Osguthorpes in consideration for the annual payment.... 
In August 1998,1 met with D. A. Osguthorpe and Stephen 
Osguthorpe on two occasions to discuss a new ski lift and a further 
expansion of the personal services to be provided by the 
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Osguthorpes. Thereafter, I drafted a second amendment to the 
Osguthorpe agreement ("Second Amendment"), which was signed 
by the parties on August 10, 1998. Again, the Second Amendment 
is very brief and is not intended to be a complete recitation of all 
[the] services to be performed by the Osguthorpes in consideration 
for the annual payment. 
Carrig Affidavit at fflf 5-7 (R. 762-763) (emphasis added). 
Stephen Osguthorpe, the other party to the ASC Utah, Inc. agreement who is not 
a party in this litigation, also submitted an affidavit, again outlining that the agreement 
was a single agreement, containing both a use of real property and personal services 
component. Stephen Osguthorpe's affidavit establishes that the payment was for both 
use of real estate and services to be performed by him. See Affidavit of Stephen 
Osguthorpe, dated January 26, 2001, at ffll 3-8 (R. 749-760). 
The testimony from each side of the ASC Utah, Inc. agreement that a single 
annual prepayment is to be made for both use of real estate and receipt of services 
from Stephen Osguthorpe is uniform, unified and consistent. Blaise Carrig, the 
president of ASC Utah, Inc. testified: 
I'm saying we looked at the total agreement for the total of 
$150,000 to include what we talked about in the agreement, but 
also to include the other things that we agreed to in the sheep 
meadow, which were Steve's consultation, Steve's support, Steve's 
[ability] to help us understand things, both politically and in the land 
use component of the plan, and for his ability to help facilitate 
certain meetings, and the many things that I had talked about 
earlier in the deposition. 
Deposition of Blaise Carrig at 40:3-12 (R. 958). In fact, if ASC Utah, Inc. had not 
obtained the agreement for Stephen A. Osguthorpe to assist it in getting permits and 
approvals, it viewed the use of the land as a minor component: "And we never had a 
reason to separate the value of one piece from another. One of the pieces of value is 
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that we didn't think that the land, without the support [services] in order to get the 
permits and the continued, ongoing planning and consultation to make the whole 
operation and planning piece work, that the land use was basically worthless if we didn't 
get the whole plan to be successful." Deposition of Blaise Carrig at 38:21-39:4 (R. 
958). 
In August 2001, in response to a dispute between Stephen A. Osguthorpe and 
ASC Utah, Inc. that resulted from the writ of garnishment issued in this case attaching 
all funds for that year's annual pre-payment, the Restatement of Agreement was 
entered into, expressly adding the Trust as a party to the ASC Utah, Inc. agreement 
and expressly allocating the annual pre-payment between the fair market value of the 
actual annual use of the Trust's real estate by ASC Utah, Inc., and the retainer services 
to be rendered principally by Stephen A. Osguthorpe. See Restatement of Agreement 
(R. 935-47). 
This Court ruled in Smith I that all such extrinsic evidence is admissible to 
determine whether the parties intended documents to be integrations. See Smith I, 
2002 UT App. 361, U 18, 58 P.3d at 857; see also Union Bank v. Swenson, 707 P.2d 
663, 665 (Utah 1985) ("Therefore, a court must first determine whether the writing was 
intended by the parties to be an integration. In resolving this preliminary question of 
fact, parol evidence, indeed any relevant evidence, is admissible."). The 
uncontroverted evidence here establishes that neither side to the ASC Utah, Inc. 
contract intended the writings to be an integration of the entire agreement. The trial 
court also ignored the express modification in 2001, in the Restatement of Agreement, 
that more fully described the actual agreement between ASC Utah, Inc. and the 
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Osguthorpes. 
Given the testimony from parties on both sides of the arms-length transaction 
that the documentation was never intended to encompass the entire agreement, and 
the fact that the documents, themselves, contain no integration clauses and are 
exceedingly brief in their nature, and the fact that Stephen A. Osguthorpe has been a 
party to the agreements, even though he never owned any of the real estate, and the 
fact that the fair market value of the actual use of the real estate on an annual basis is 
only $3,275.50 (see Plaintiffs Memorandum in Response to Defendants' Motion to 
Revisit and/or Clarify the Court's July 8, 2003 Memorandum Decision and Objection to 
Form of Judgment, at 6 (R. 1239); Defendants' Memorandum in Their Motion to Revisit 
and/or Clarify the Court's July 8, 2003 Memorandum Decision and Objection to Form of 
Judgment, at 10, R. 1220); Garnishee Answers to Interrogatories, Answer to 
Interrogatory No. 3, dated November 19, 2003 (R. 1288)), the facts and inferences, 
construed in the light most favorable to defendants, show a genuine issue of material 
fact as to whether the documents were intended to be integrations. That genuine issue 
of material fact precludes a finding on summary judgment that the parties to the 
agreement intended something that they ail testified was not their intent. 
In Smith /, this Court, sua sponte, stated in dictum that: "Even if the evidence 
offered on remand 'is uncontroverted, [the district] court is free to disregard such 
[evidence] if it finds the evidence "self-serving and not credible."'" Smith I, 2002 UT App. 
361 at T| 46, 58 P.3d at 864 (quoting Glauser Storage, LLC. v. Smedley, 2001 UT App. 
26 
141,U 24, 27 P.3d 565).2 No evidence in the record exists, however, to suggest that 
the testimony from both sides of this arms-length transaction between the Osguthorpes 
and ASC Utah, Inc. could in any way not be credible. Clearly, the testimony from non-
party ASC Utah, Inc.'s managing director and president, Blaise Carrig, could not be 
"self-serving" in this litigation in which ASC Utah, Inc. is not a party. ASC Utah, Inc. 
must make its annual pre-payments. 
In any event, this Court's quotation from Glauser Storage, LLC. v. Smedley is 
not applicable to the procedural posture of this case. Glauser Storage was decided 
after a trial on the merits, where issues of weight and credibility may be raised, and 
certainly were hotly contested in that case. See id. at If 11, 27 P.3d at 568 ("At the 
conclusion of the bench trial, the court held . . . . " ) 
The applicable law pertaining to factual issues analyzed in the procedural 
context of summary judgment in this case, however, absolutely prohibits any such 
weighing of evidence or credibility assessments. See Mountain States Telephone & 
Telegraph Co. v. Atkin, Wright & Miles, Chartered, 681 P.2d at 1261, ("Doubts, 
uncertainties or inferences concerning issues of fact must be construed in the light most 
favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. Litigants must be able to present 
their cases fully to the court before judgment can be rendered against them unless it is 
obvious from the evidence before the court that the party opposing judgment can 
2
 The question of the weight or credibility of the testimony, or how the trial 
court should view weight or credibility, had not been raised in the trial court or briefed by 
any party to the appeal. Indeed, since the case went up on summary judgment, under 
the applicable legal standards set forth in Part I of this Brief, above, weight and 
credibility issues were wholly immaterial to this Court's ruling in Smith I. 
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establish no right to recovery. The trial court must not weigh evidence or assess 
credibility. [Emphasis added and footnotes omitted]"); accord Hause v. Armour of 
America, Inc., 886 P.2d 542, 544 (Utah Ct.App. 1994) ("In considering a motion for 
summary judgment, it is improper for the trial court or this court on appeal to weigh the 
evidence or assess its credibility."). Thus, the trial court was not free upon remand to 
weigh the proffered evidence or to assess the credibility of the affidavits or deposition 
testimony. 
Particularly telling, concerning the trial court's error, is its unwillingness to 
properly explain its decision after summary judgment on remand. The trial court failed 
to comply with the apparent intent of this Court in remanding, i.e., to require specificity 
in the trial court's ruling. In that regard, this Court's remand direction in Smith I appears 
to follow the Utah Supreme Court's direction in the case of Platts v. Parents Helping 
Parents dba Turnabout, 947 P.2d at 663 (Utah 1997): 
It is unclear what undisputed facts the trial court relied upon 
in its grant of summary judgment wherein it concluded that 
Turnabout was a "health care provider." Without an adequate basis 
of undisputed facts, summary judgment is inappropriate. Without 
an adequate indication as to the undisputed facts that were applied 
to the law, it is impossible to determine on appeal whether the trial 
court erred in its application of the law to those facts. Therefore, 
the court of appeals should have remanded the matter to the 
trial court to set out an adequate basis of undisputed facts to 
justify its grant of summary judgment or, if necessary, to hold 
further proceedings to make adequate factual determinations. 
Therefore, the court of appeals erred in concluding, as a matter of 
law and without an undisputed factual basis, that Turnabout was 
not a "health care provider." 
Id. (emphasis added). In fact, in this case, no evidence supports the trial court's 
decision, and all evidence is contrary. 
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B. There Has Never Been Any Evidence Offered Of Exactly What 
Payment D.A. Osguthorpe Has Received, Nor Of What the 
Osguthorpe Family Partnership Has Received, So As To Support 
Specific Dollar Judgments Against Either. 
Smith's Complaint sought, as a prerequisite to entry of money judgments against 
either D.A. Osguthorpe or the Osguthorpe Family Partnership, an accounting of what 
funds had been received by each. See Complaint, Prayer for Relief (R. 5-6). In 
addition to not determining how the payments were segregated between use of real 
estate and services, the trial court simply glossed-over the necessary factual step of 
determining what payments each defendant had in fact received, so as to be required 
to "share" with Smith. 
The trial court substituted, for proof that was not offered by Smith, its speculation 
that D.A. Osguthorpe and the Osguthorpe Family Partnership somehow would jointly 
and severally respond in damages (again, without any factual basis for such liability) for 
whatever payments were made by ASC Utah, Inc. to any person or successor-in-
interest in the real estate. Such conclusion, unsupported by record facts, does not 
meet the requirements of Rule 56 to establish entitlement to judgment as a matter of 
law, and is nothing but an unconstitutional, arbitrary and capricious guess. The ruling is 
infirm under due process requirements for failure to require compliance with the 
mandatory requirement of Rule 4-501 that facts be separately set forth with record 
citations and as being an arbitrary and capricious conclusion. There is not even any 
legal theory that could support both defendants being liable under the 1966 Document 
for payments received only by one or the other, let alone payments received by non-
parties, such as the Dr. D.A. Osguthorpe Trust, which became entitled to the payments 
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upon becoming a successor-in-interest to ownership of the land. Neither the Due 
Process clauses of the Utah or United States constitutions tolerate penalizing 
defendants, because they have freely exercised their right to convey their land, by 
imposing a damages award against them for payments received by their successors-in-
interest. 
Procedural due process protects against arbitrary takings by government. See 
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 82 (1972) (the procedural due process guarantee 
protects against "arbitrary takings"). Such conveyance to the Trust occurred before 
Smith even made any claim, and defendants cannot be punished for Smith's own 
failure to name the proper successor-in-interest to the property as a defendant in this 
case. 
Smith here has brought a breach of contract claim, arising out of the dissolution 
agreement between Smith's decedent, on the one hand, and defendant D.A. 
Osguthorpe, on the other hand. The trial court itself previously characterized that 
agreement as an agreement that "if the disputed property was sold or leased for a 
certain price, they would split the profits." Memorandum Decision, dated December 15, 
1999, at 5 (R. 206). If either defendant has not in fact received such a contractually-
defined "profit" to "split" then the entry of judgment against that defendant for that 
particular sum would, a fortiori, be arbitrary and capricious. 
Smith's complaint expressly asks for the following relief: 
For an order directing the Osguthorpes to account to Plaintiff for all 
moneys received by them from a lease or leases and any 
amendments thereto of the property described in the Agreement.. 
» 
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Complaint, Prayer For Relief, U 1 (R. 5-6) (emphasis added). This is the relief sought 
because neither defendant can answer in damages for money they have not received. 
Smith, in his motion for summary judgment before the trial court, offered no evidence of 
any particular amount actually received by any defendant under the ASC Utah, Inc. 
Agreement in any year. Had Smith followed the mandatory procedure of Rule 56 and 
the Judicial Council Rules of Judicial Administration, defendants could have fully 
addressed this issue, the trial court's arbitrary and capricious extension beyond the 
relief pleaded, which is based utterly on speculation, is not sustainable under Rule 56 
or the due process clause of the Utah and United States Constitutions. 
The evidence already in the record in this case shows unequivocally that the 
property was again transferred, to the Dr. D.A. Osguthorpe Family Trust, on May 13, 
1998, by special warranty deed (recorded August 20, 1998, months before this litigation 
even commenced). See Affidavit of Mary Katherine Johnston, dated April 27, 2000, 
and Exhibits thereto constituting recorded special warranty deed, attached thereto as 
Exhibit "A" (R. 526-548). To the extent that such non-party Trust has received monies 
to which Smith claims a right to "share equally," a damages award could enter only 
against the Trust, and not D.A. Osguthorpe or the Family Partnership, after the Trust 
owned the property and became legally entitled to receive the payments. 
No evidence was submitted by Smith to show that either defendant actually 
received any particular amount of money from ASC Utah, Inc., pursuant to the 
agreement, for any reason. Despite this absence of any evidentiary submission by 
Smith, the trial court actually awarded several hundreds of thousands of dollars in 
additional damages, against both defendants. 
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III. SINCE THIS COURT REVERSED THE ORIGINAL JUDGMENT ON DAMAGES, THERE WAS 
No BASIS FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO HOLD THE ESCROWED FUNDS GARNISHED FROM 
ASC UTAH, INC. UPON A WRIT ISSUING UPON THAT JUDGMENT, OR TO RELEASE 
THEM TO SMITH, RATHER THAN ASC UTAH, INC. 
The original judgment was reversed by this Court with respect to damages, and 
this Court ruled that the absence of an integration would mean that "there is a material 
issue of fact as to damages." Smith I, 2002 UT App. 361, U 45. In other words, a 
separation of the annual payment into components for use of real estate and for 
payment for services would result in a reduction of any judgment to Smith. 
More significantly, however, the trial court had no right to continue to hold funds 
attached upon a garnishment that was predicated upon the now-reversed judgment, or 
to release them to Smith. Since the original judgment was no longer effective due to 
the reversal, the garnishment was no longer effective and the funds should have been 
released to the garnishee, ASC Utah, Inc., for payment to Stephen Osguthorpe under 
its contract. Utah law is quite clear that the writ of garnishment and interim garnishee 
order entered by the trial court on the original judgment which this Court reversed were 
of no further effect. "It is undisputed that a writ of execution may only be issued on a 
'final' judgment, and a writ of execution issued on a judgment which has been reversed 
or set aside is of no effect. D'Aston v. Aston, 844 P.2d 345, 349 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
See generally, 30 Am.Jur.2d Executions § 12 (1967)." Thus, the garnisheed funds 
were no longer subject to the power of the trial court and the trial court should have 
authorized Zions Bank to release those funds to garnishee ASC Utah, Inc. for payment 
to Stephen A. Osguthorpe under its contract, instead of releasing them to Smith. 
Finally, Rule 64D(i) clearly contemplates a trial, and a jury trial, if requested, of 
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contested fact issues on garnishments. See UTAH R. CIV. P. 64D(i) ("Such new matter 
in reply shall be taken as denied and the matter thus at issue shall be tried in the same 
manner as other issues of like nature. Judgment shall be entered upon the verdict or 
finding the same as if the garnishee had answered according to such verdict or 
finding.") The party traversing a garnishment is "entitled to have them tried." Troshinsky 
v. Feldman, 81 A.2d 91, 93 (D.C. 1951). Accord Stewart v. Stewart, 160 Ga. App. 463, 
464, 287 S.E.2d 378, 379 (1981)("The trial court erred in ruling that Code Ann. § 24-
305b does not apply to garnishment actions, and in refusing to hear evidence based on 
appellant's traverse that the appellee had withheld visitation rights."). The trial court's 
refusal to allow a trial on defendants' traversal denied defendants due process of law 
and was error, invalidating the garnishment proceeding. 
CONCLUSION 
The summary judgment on damages should be reversed and the case 
remanded for trial on damages. The garnishee order releasing $200,000 (together with 
accrued interest) to Smith should be reversed, and an order entered that such funds 
should be paid to the garnishee, ASC Utah, Inc. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ ^ day of April, 2004. 
PETERS SCOFIELD PRICE 
A Professional Corporation 
DAVID W. SCOFIELD 
Attorneys for the Appellants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that two true and correct copies of the above 
and foregoing Appellants' Opening Brief were mailed, postage prepaid, this ^ 
day of April, 2004, to the following: 
Hardin A. Whitney 
Moyle & Draper, P.C. 
City Centre I, Suite 900 
175 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Robert G. Wing 
Prince Yeates & Geldzahler 
City Centre I, Suite 900 
175 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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ADDENDUM 1 
Hardin A. "Whitney (3456) 
MOYLE& DRAPER, P.C. 
City Centre I, Suite 900 
175 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 521-0250 
FILES DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
Deputy Clerk 
Robert G. Wing (4445) 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
City Centre I, Suite 900 
175 East Fourth South ENTERED IN REGISTRY 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 OF JUDGMENTS 
(8oi)524.iooo IMAGED
 DATr_ b Tc/lL 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ENOCH RICHARD SMITH, as 
Personal Representative of the Estate 
of ENOCH SMITH, JR., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
D.A. OSGUTHORPE, an 
individual, and D.A. OSGUTHORPE 
FAMILY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 98-091-1302 
Judge Glen IwaSaki 
On September 12, 2000, this Court issued a Memorandum Decision. Based upon that 
Memorandum Decision, 
IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiff recover from Defendants 
$498,441.02, which includes prejudgment interest through September 20,2000. It is further 
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED THAT Plaintiff recover from Defendants daily prejudgment 
interest in the amount of $88.53 per day from September 20, 2000 until the date this Judgment 
is entered, and that Plaintiff recover from Defendants postjudgment interest at the rate of 
8.052% until paid, plus court costs of $ 507.27. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, DECLARED AND ADJUDGED that Defendants are 
obligated to pay to Plaintiff Plaintiff's share of future lease payments as described in the 
Dissolution Agreement dated November 3, 1966 and that this Court shall retain continuing 
jurisdiction over this matter. 
DATED this £ _ day tfr-^fA^ , 2001. 
BYT] 
Glenn K. Iwasaki 
Third Judicial Court Judge 
ADDENDUM 2 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ENOCH RICHARD SMITH, as Persona l 
R e p r e s e n t a t i v e of t he E s t a t e of 
ENOCH SMITH, JR. 
P l a i n t i f f , 
vs . 
D.A. OSGUTHORPE, an individual, 




Case No. 980911302 
Honorable GLENN K. IWASAKI 
Court Clerk: Ja*®MMfaxSfMtn 
Third Judicial District 
June 30, 2003 




The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, for Modification of 
Judgment and for Release of Escrowed Funds. The Court heard oral 
argument with respect to the matter on June 30, 2003. Following 
the hearing, the issue was taken under advisement. 
The Court having considered the motion, memoranda, exhibits 
attached thereto and for the good cause shown hereby enters the 
following ruling. 
Plaintiff filed this Complaint alleging, pursuant to a 
Partnership Dissolution Agreement, he was entitled to his share of 
proceeds from the Lease Agreement between D. A. Osguthorpe and The 
Canyons. Since this filing, several hearings have been held and 
rulings made and, ultimately, the matter went up on appeal. The 
Court of Appeals affirmed all of this Court's ruling, except the 
\W 
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one relating to whether the Lease Agreement was an integrated 
agreement. Specifically, the Court of Appeals held: 
On remand the district court should make clear 
it considered the parole evidence in ruling 
the lease and the amendments are integrated or 
it should take evidence to determine if the 
lease and the amendments are integrated. 
In support of the motion, plaintiff asserts the Court did 
consider the parole evidence in ruling the lease and amendments are 
integrated and such is evident from the record. Specifically, 
plaintiff cites to various affidavits, Memorandum Decisions and 
statements during oral argument, wherein the issue of integration 
was considered and analyzed. Additionally, plaintiff seeks entry 
of a new judgment arguing this Court has already determined the 
lease agreement to be integrated, consequently, all of the payments 
from The Canyons are lease payments. Finally, plaintiff notes the 
parties put a garnished lease payment for the 2001 lease in an 
interest bearing saving account-pending further resolution of this 
matter. If the Court grants plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, it is plaintiff's position the Court should enter an 
order releasing the funds in .Zions Bank to plaintiff and the 
judgment should be reduced accordingly. 
Defendants oppose the motion arguing plaintiffs have failed to 
set forth a proper statement of facts. Additionally, contend 
defendants, the sworn statements from D.A. Osguthorpe and Stephen 
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A. Osguthorpe, on the Osguthorpe side of the transaction, and 
Blaise Carrig, on the ASC Utah side of the transaction, each state 
that they did not intend the documents to be a full and complete 
representation of the agreement between them. Moreover, assert 
defendants, the decision of the Court of Appeals requires this 
Court to apportion the lease payments and there are genuine issues 
of material fact as to whether and how much of the payment was for 
the use of real estate that would be covered under the dissolution 
agreement. Finally, it is defendant's position that since the 
judgment was reversed, this Court has no right to hold funds 
attached upon a garnishment. 
Although not specifically stated, the Court finds that after 
reviewing the procedural history in this matter, it is clear parole 
evidence was considered in the rulings rendered in this matter. 
Indeed, in making its various decisions, the Court considered the 
Affidavits of D.A. Osguthorpe, Stephen Osguthorpe and Blaise 
Carrig. Moreover, the Court heard parole evidence during oral 
argument, prior to rendering its decision. In sum, summary 
judgment, as requested by plaintiff, is appropriate. Further, in 
light of this ruling, a new judgment should be entered reflecting 
current amounts. Plaintiff is asked to submit such a judgment to 
the Court for signature. Finally, based upon the forgoing, the 
Court orders the escrowed funds currently held in Zions Bank be 
HI* 
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released. 
DATED this / 
Jm? 
day of &aif£r 2003, 
GLENN K. IWASAKI o'\ 
DISTRICT COURT dtftfpJSO*-* 
,/ 
Wv> 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 980911302 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail DAVID W SCOFIELD 
ATTORNEY DEF 
111 E BROADWAY 11TH FLR 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111 
Mail HARDIN A WHITNEY 
ATTORNEY PLA 
CITY CENTER I, SUITE 900 
175 EAST FOURTH SOUTH 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 
84111-0000 
Dated this •_&_ day of "CEINA.JU, / 2 0 ^ ^ 
75 
k$Ji± J& 
Deputy Court Clerk 
Page 1 (last) 
ADDENDUM 3 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ENOCH RICHARD SMITH, as Personal 
Representative of the Estate of 
ENOCH SMITH, JR. 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
D.A. OSGUTHORPE, an individual, 




Case No. 980911302 
Honorable GLENN K. IWASAKI 
Court Clerk: Janet Banks 
August 27, 2003 
The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to 
Defendants' Motion to Revisit and/or to Clarify the Court's July 8, 
2003 Memorandum Decision and Defendants' Notice of Objection to 
Proposed Form of Judgment and Form of Order Releasing Escrowed 
Funds. Although a hearing was requested, such is not required by 
the Rules of Judicial Administration, nor is the Court persuaded 
argument would be of assistance in the instance. Accordingly, the 
ruling with respect to the aforementioned will be addressed in this 
Minute Entry. 
Turning first to Defendants' Motion to Revisit and/or Clarify, 
after reviewing the record in this matter, the Court is persuaded 
its July 8, 2003 Memorandum Decision clearly follows the direction 
of the Utah Court of Appeals by reviewing the procedural history of 
the case and stating that it had considered the proffered parole 
evidence. Nothing remains to be considered. Accordingly, 
Defendants' Motion is, respectfully, denied. 
As to Defendants' Notice of Objection to Proposed Form of 
Judgment and Form of Order Releasing Escrowed Funds, the Court 
finds such to be without merit and, accordingly, the objections are 
overruled. The Court will sign the Judgment and Order Releasing 
Escrowed Funds as submitted by plaintiff. 
This Minute Entry constitutes the Order regarding the matters 
addressed herein. No further order is required. 
SMITH V. OSGUTHORPE Page 2 MINUTE ENTRY 
DATED th »Z0 day of August, 2003 
GLENN K. FWASAKI 
DISTRICT COURT JUD^E1 
\ si2*>* 
1*5* 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 980911302 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail DAVID W SCOFIELD 
ATTORNEY DEF 
111 E BROADWAY 11TH FLR 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111 
Mail HARDIN A WHITNEY 
ATTORNEY PLA 
CITY CENTER I, SUITE 900 
175 EAST FOURTH SOUTH 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 
84111-0000 
Dated t h i s S ^ day of N A ' V C V V ^ A ,- 2 0 ^ 6 . 
C 
Deputy Court Clerk 
Page 1 (last) VV& 
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IMAGED 
Hardin A. Whitney (#3456) 
MOYLE & DRAPER, P.C. 
City Centre I, Suite 900 
175 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
(801) 521-0250 
Robert G. Wing (#4445) 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
City Centre I, Suite 900 
175 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 524-1000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
FH.g®®i§?MTCSUIT 
Third Judicial District 
2 8 2003 
Deputy Clerk 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ENOCH RICHARD SMITH, as Personal 
Representative of the Estate of 
ENOCH SMITH, JR. 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
D. A. OSGUTHORPE, an individual, 




Civil No. 980911302 
Judge Glen Iwasaki 
IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiff recover from Defendants, jointly 
and severally, $845,173.02 which includes prejudgment interest through July 11, 2003. It is 
further ORDERED AND ADJUDGED THAT Plaintiff recover from Defendants daily 
prejudgment interest in the amount of $170.35 per day from July 11, 2003, until the date this 
Judgment is entered, and that Plaintiff recover from Defendants post judgment interest at the 
rate of 3.41% until paid, plus court costs of $507.27. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, DECLARED AND ADJUDGED that Defendants are 
obligated to pay to Plaintiff its share of future lease payments as described in the Dissolution 
Agreement dated November 3, 1966 and that this Court shall retain continuing jurisdiction 
over this matter. 
Concurrently with the entry of this Judgment, the Court has entered an Order releasing certain 
escrowed funds to Plaintiff. Upon the receipt of the escrowed funds Plaintiff is ordered to file a 
Satisfaction of Judgment equal to the amount received, 
lis ^S dayol DATED this ly, 2003. 
BY THE COURT 
Honorable GUehn K. Iwasaki X'^/T1,"; 
Third Judicial District Court Judge 
Approved as to form: 
David W. Scofield 
Attorney for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on the \\ ' day of July, 2003,1 served a copy of the foregoing 
JUDGMENT by hand delivery, to: 
David W. Scofield 
Parsons, Kinghorn & Peters 
111 East Broadway, 11th Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
ADDENDUM 5 
Hardin A. Whitney (#3456) 
MOYLE & DRAPER, P.C. 
City Centre I, Suite 900 
175 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
(801) 521-0250 
Robert G. Wing (#4445) 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
City Centre I, Suite 900 
175 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 524-1000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ENOCH RICHARD SMITH, as Personal 
Representative of the Estate of 
ENOCH SMITH, JR. 
Plaintiff 
vs. : ORDER RELEASING 
: ESCROWED FUNDS 
D. A. OSGUTHORPE, an individual, : 
and D. A. OSGUTHORPE FAMILY : Civil No. 980911302 
PARTNERSHIP, : 
Defendants. : Judge Glen Iwasaki 
TO ZIONS BANK: 
You are herewith authorized and directed to release the funds deposited with you in 
money market account entitled Estate of Enoch Smith, Jr., Account Number 003-68566-6, to 
Enoch Richard Smith, Personal Representative of the Estate of Enoch Smith, Jr. Upon delivery 
F§L i^lST5l8S?T©8fti8t 
Third Judicial District 
I^LLO 
of all of the flmds in the account, it may be closed. 




Approved as to form: 
David W. Scofield 
Attorney for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on the _v day of July, 2003,1 served a copy of the 
foregoing ORDER RELEASING ESCROWED FUNDS by hand delivery, to: 
David W. Scofield 
Parsons, Kinghorn & Peters 
111 East Broadway, 11th Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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ADDENDUM 6 
EnfiyNfc-JLQASJfclii' buok . J U L 
REQI; : ;?
 ef JSZi2..*-.5szis 
FEE , „ ^ WANOAY. y;wccs, suj.!Mrfoii/r,:o.9r1pnr 
$ lO^V- B^*W&t&3^wfc 
INDBCISD O ri ABSTRACT #._/ ' 
A G R E E M E N T 
THIS AGREEMENT, made and entered into this i?—' 
day of Uovember, 1966, by and between ENOCH SMITH, JR., of Salt 
Lake City, Utah, hereinafter referred to as First Party, and 
D. A. OSOOTHORPB, of Salt Lake County, State of Dtah, herein-
after referred to as Second Party, 
W I T H B S S B T H i 
WHEREAS, First and Second Parties, for over ten (10) 
years were partners primarily engaged in the cattle and sheep 
businesses, having operated under the partnership names of 
Av & En, Aveneen Land & Livestock Company, and Aveneen Partner-
ship, Tand as Red Pine Land- & Livestock company, ana in some 
instances operated some portions of the partnership businesses 
under their individual names without disclosing the partnership 
relationship between them; and 
WHEREAS, First and Second Parties have heretofore 
terminated all partnership relations entered into by fcham as 
partners and have discontinued the partnership businesses, 
dissolved the partnership or partnerships that have heretofore 
existed between them, and now desire to settle all of the rights 
between them in the partnership businesses and affairs; ^ 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT 18 HEREBY AGREED by and between JJTj 
First and Second Parties as follows 1 
Except as hereinafter reserved to First Party, First 
O 
Party agrees to sell to Second Party all of First Party's s^ 
O 
right, title, interest and estate in and to all partnership O 
assets, and Second Party agrees to purchase from .First Party 
all of his said right, title, interest and estate in and to 
all partnership assets upon the following terms and conditions, 
to-witi 
1. The partnership assets and properties covered 
hereby shall includei 
(a) Any cash on hand and all accounts receivable 
this date; 
(b) All sheep, including ewes, bucks and lambs, 
together with all registered brands and markings; 
(c) All grazing permits and rights, including 
the Qraasing Permits located within what is known and desig-
nated by the Bureau of Land Management, U. S. Department of 
the Interior as the -Fillmore, Utah-, Grazing District) -hereto-
fore purchased from T. Traoy Wright, together With the right 
to purchase an additional 500 head of sheep Permit or License 
as provided in the Agreement dated the 24th day of October, 
1961, between the said T. Tracy Wright, as Seller, and the 
parties hereto as Buyers; Wasatah national Forest Permits for 
619 head of sheep; United States Department of the Interior, 
Bureau of Land Management, License for Taylor Grazing Rights, 
Park City Area-Summit, U, number and class 60 S, Unit 72; °0' 
{<&) All Leases, including State of Utah Public ^ 
CO 
Land Lease No. 10925, covering 487.28 acres in Section 2, v.r 
Township 2 South, Range 3 Bast, Summit County, Utah; 
Grazing Lease from Edward Bagley and Irvin T. Nelson, S ^ 
covering property located in Salt Lake County, Utah; CD 
O 
(e) All horses and other animals, if any, in ® 
addition to the sheep; 
J 
(f) All truoks, maohinery and equipment) 
(g) In addition to the above described property, 
First Party agrees to sell to Second Party, his interest in 
the following described real property located in Summit 
County, Utah, subject, however, to the reservation of in-
terests therein by First Party as hereinafter specifically 
set fortht 
Lota 3, 4, ,5 and 6 of Sec. 1; T. 2 S., R. 3 5., 
fy Salt Lake Meridian. 
Lots 1, 2, 7, 8, 9, 10 and the SB quarter of 
Sec. 3; T. 2 S. R. 3 B., Salt Lake Base and 
^ Meridian. 
.j' Beginning at a point 1208.5 feet South 1°48' 
West from the Northeast corner of Section 1, 
Township 2 South, Range 3 Sast, Salt Lake Base 
and Meridian, running thence South 1*48' West 
2 feet, thence South 36*08' West 168.7 feet, 
thence North 89°50' West 3082.6 feet, thence 
North 0,°-54' Bast 139.2 feet, thence South 
89°SO' Bast 3177.6 feet to point of beginning, 
containing 10 acres. 
Total acres 577.33, more or less. 
So long as Second Party shall use said real property as 
grazing lands in connection with his operation of a sheep or 
cattle business, Seoond Party shall have the right to the posses-
sion and use of the property without compensation to First Party, 
but he Bhall pay the taxes and any expense of maintaining the 
property. In the event, however, that Second party or his 
successor or successors in interest, during the lifetime of the ^T\ 
survivor of FirBt and Second Parties, plus twenty-one (21) years, ' ^ 
CO 
in a good faith transaction, shall aell the property, or atiy part <~C 
CAM 
thereof at a price exceeding Twenty Dollars ($20.00) per acre, 
plus the depreciated cost of any fencing that Second Party may «g 
have caused to be dona on the property, then FirBt Party shall, O 
O 
CD 
share equally with Second Party In the sales price paid over 
Twenty Dollars ($20,00) per acre, plus said depreciated fencing 
cost, and if, during Bald period of time he, or his successor 
or successors in interest in the property shall lease all or any 
part of the property, for any period of time commencing during 
said retained interest period, at a price in excess of $1.60 
per aore per year, First Party shall share equally In the excess 
rental over the $1.60 per acre per year. Furthermore, Party of 
the First Part shall retain an undivided one-half (1/2) interest 
in all mineral and oil rights in the property without limit as 
to time. 
2. Second Party agrees to pay First Party for his 
interest in the above described property, and in settlement of 
ell claims heretofore existing between the parties arising out 
of any of the partnership business or businesses, the sum of 
Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000.00) cash, payment thereof to be 
made within thirty (30) days from date hereof. Xn addition to 
the payment of said Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000.00) to First 
Party, Second Party agrees to assume, pay and otherwise perform 
all of the outstanding obligations of the partnership businesses, 
whether incurred under the name of Av & En, Aveneen Land & Live-
stock Company, Aveneen Partnership, Red Pine Land & Livestock 
O 
Company, or in any other names, including the personal names of £. 
the parties hereto. Specifically included in these obligations, ^ 5 
but not excluding any other obligations, are any and all bank c— 
loans, including the amounts owing Walker Bank & Trust Company, 
the loan made by Utah Livestock Production Credit Association, v^ 
O 
the accounts owing for grazing fees to Bothwell and Swanner Co. O 
*e$ty\JVl»0off*k and to Bdward Baglay and Irvin T. Nelson on their 
grazing lease, and every and all other obligations of any of 
the said partnerships, whether or not specifically set forth 
herein; except, that Second Party will not assume any indebted-
ness owing by any of the said partnerships to Bnoch Smith Sons 
Company on account of work done by said company for the partnerr 
ships, except that Second Party shall pay Bnoch Smith Sons 
Company for the advance made by it on account of lease fees to 
Bothwall and Swanner Co:, in tha sum of $2,176.50. Further, Second 
Party agrees to assume any income tax liability for the current 
year and on account of any audits that may hereafter be made of 
the income tax returns heretofore filed covering the partner-
ship business or businesses. Provided, 'however, that First Party 
will retain all of his books, records and other accounts relating 
to the partnership businesses for a period of at least six years, 
and will fully cooperate with Second party in connection with any 
audita or other questions raised in connection with the partner-
ships' income tax returns. Further, Second Party agrees to save 
First Party harmless on acoount of that certain suit brought in 
the District Court of Summit County, by Ed Roberts, Howard , ^ 
Whitehouse and Marion Christenaeh, as plaintiffs, against First U J 
CO 
and Second Parties, case Ho. 3527. Second Party to assume the *~£ 
defense of the action on behalf of both himself and First Party, 
and to pay all costs and expenses, including attorneys' fees gg 
that Second party may incur in defense of the action and any CD 
CD 
judgment that the plaintiffs in aaid action, or any of them, 
may pbtain against First party. 
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3. Upon payment in full of the purchase price to be 
paid by Second Party to First Party as hereinabove in paragraph 
2 provided, First Party agrees to execute and deliver to Second 
Party such Assignments, Deeds and Bills of Sale as may be neces-
sary to transfer and convey to Second Party all of the interest 
in the partnership businesses of First Party as hereinabove 
provided, with the exception of the interests retained by him 
in the real property speoifically hereinabove described in 
paragraph 1 (g) 
4. The parties hereto agree that the Partnerships 
heretofore existing between them have been dissolved as of the 
17th day of January, 1966, effective .January 1, 1S66, and notice 
thereof has. hezetofoxe been-published as provided by law. TJei'ther 
party has authority to wind up partnership affairs and Second 
Party, by this Agreement, has succeeded to all of said partner-
ship, affairs upon the terms and conditions hereinabove set forth. 
5. Subject to the provisions of this Agreement/ the 
parties hereto do hereby release and discharge one another from 
all claims of whatsoever nature arising out of their former 
partnership relationships. ^ 
r*\ 
WITNESS the execution hereof by the parties hereto, V'2 
the year and day hereinabove first written. 1" 
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Sesphd Party.; 
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STATB OP UTAH, ) 
) as . 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKB, ) 
On the . 3 - day of HvytuuA^/ . 1966, personally 
appeared before me ENOCH SMITH, JR. one of the signers of the 
. s'l'tfll&bbvfr'instrument, Who duly acknowledged t o me that he executed 
Notary 
Residing in Sal t take,.City, Utah 
STATE OP UTAH, ) 
) BB. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, ) 
On the 3 - day of //fjjhtCtvvft*/*. 1966, personally 
appeared before me 0 . A. OSGUTHORPE, one of tha signers of the 
• ''^ OVsjj'CMB instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that he executed 
^ -'.-:;Mr.'>M.'.:3 
'•.^'.'in,^'1' fiotary 
'"'""'' Residing in Sal t ilake County,Utah 
/ r^ 
X, AFTON S. 0S6UTH0RPB, the wife of D. A. Osguthorpe, /v\ 
UJ 
Second Party in the foregoing Agreement, do hereby approve the ^ 
above and foregoing Agreement and agree that any in teres t that 
I nay have in and t o the rea l property described in paragraph c -
SE 
1 (g) of the Agreement s h a l l be subject to the provisions of ^ 
O 
said paragraph 1 (g) and tha other applicable provisions of the CD 
foregoing Agreement. 
- 8 -
Dated at S a l t Iiaka County, Utah, thia 3A*L. day of 
•OpJ^^^JJLJ . 1966. 
( y 6 i c / ; / (. ..•> e, ,sCt£&i4>j>J 
STATS OF OTAH, ) 
) 8 8 . 
CODOTX" OF SAUT LAKE, ) 
?.'"£.» V*. On ^ e ^ toy °t ffah-t4#/]>-6f . 1966, personally 
^b&forst'mo ASTON 8 . OSGUTHORPH, one of the algnees of the 
5%it&°^ ijjoi^jf^^trumant, Vho duly acknowledged to me that she executed 
STofeafy, 








THIS AGREEMENT is made by and between D.A. OSGUTHORPE and DA. 
OSGUTHQRPE FAMILY PARTNERSHIP as lessors and WOLF MOUNTAIN 
RESORTS, L.C. as lessee. DA. Osguthorpe is the owner of real property 
described in Exhibit "A" (hereinafter referred to as the *Tropeny"), consisting of 
approximately 560 acres. Wolf Mountain, is a ski/summer resort operator and 
intends to expand its operation to the Property. 
In consideration of the mutual covenants, promises and conditions set fourth herein, 
the parties agree as follows: 
P A Osgutharpe hereby leases the specific portions of Property to Wolf Mountain 
for use as a commercial recreational area, including the installation, maintenance 
and operation of two ski lifts, snow making and clearing of ski trails and such other 
related facilities, structures and roads as may be required. Specifically Saddleback 
and Doc's Knob chair lifts as identified on Exhibit "A", including ski trails servicing 
Doc's Knob and lower sliver of the quarter section additionally identified on Exhibit 
"A". Notwithstanding the rights granted to Wolf Mountain herein, DA. Osguthdrpe 
shall be permitted to improve and to use the Property provided that such 
improvement or use does not interfere -with ski lifts and similar structures and ruris 
of Lessee. Ski trails, lifts and facilities shall not be constructed on the. southernmost 
#6 (40 acres) and £5 (40 acres) other dian those previously identified of the 
Property described in Exhibit "A*' paragraph 1. 
Wolf Mountain shall pay to DA. Osguthorpe annual rental payments for the 
Property in the amount of S100,OQO due and payable on August 12 of each year. 
The term of the lease shall expire twenty eight years from the execution date of this 
agreement 
AGREED, GRANTED AND ACCEPTED, this W!&y of August, 1996. 
D J . OsE«itorpe "iMar fir / Kcttos&W. 
(J ff y WoLfMount 
OsgufciarpaSanuly PanaersWp 
Qris 
ain Resofe. L.C. 
DA. 
WrmESS: 
0 0 4 6 O S 9 2 EsdWSS Ps00780 
EXHIBIT "B n 
i:=WK4 e;uruwH"i:n< P.KTBb?.RjeR wanTW J.UC!NnS:lXH=i Hfe:CT i £ B3-"mr 
ADDENDUM 8 
8f 
The following agreement amends and clarifies the existing agreement dated the 14th day 
of August, 1996 between Wolf Mountain (now The Canyons) and the Osguthorpe family: 
1) The Canyons will construct a jeep/snowmobile road from the top 
of Saddleback towards Red Pine Lake and on toward the bottom of 
Saddleback area. The road will also be continued from the top of 
Saddleback to the northwest corner of Section 3. Steve Osguthorpe and 
Blaise Carrigto approve the alignment prior to construction. 
2) The Canyons will relocate and upgrade the existing Saddleback 
lift to the location approved by Steve Osguthorpe and Blaise Camg. 
3) The Canyons will be able to complete the Saddleback area trail 
construction as approved by Steve Osguthorpe and Blaise Carrig. 
4) The Canyons are able to relocate and upgrade the existing 
Spotted Owl chair to the location shown on the attached map. This 
relocation to be approved by and Blaise Carrig and Steve Osguthorpe. 
5) The Canyons will repair and upgrade the lower jeep road on 
Osguthorpe property as shown on the .attached map for 
construction and maintenance access. 
6) The Canyons will construct and maintain a road on Osguthorpe 
property from Red Pine Lake to the top of Tombstone. This road is 
to be used by the Canyons construction and maintenance only. 
7) Tie Canyons commits to working with the Osguthorpe family to 
ensure that snowmobile and horse riding operation can continue for 
the entire terms of this agreement. The Canyons committed to 
working with the Osguthorpes to resolve any issue? of the 
interference or conflict between these operations and the ski 
development. 
8) The Canyons can construct a ski trail that crosses the south west comer 
of lot 5 of the Osguthorpe property quarter section. This trail to be 
approved by Steve Osguthorpe and and Blaise Carrig 
9) The Canyons will include the Osguthorpes in their master planning 
process. 
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10) The Canyons will pay an adairional 550,000 in lease payments for the 
term of the August 14th, 1996 agreement to the Osguthorpes in 
consideration for this agreement.. 
Both parties agree to work together in good faith and *o maintain open 
communications. The Canyons accepEs the obligation to notice and seek approval 
from the Osguthorpes an any matters of change to their lands. 
AGREED, GRANTED AND ACCEPTED, this 2Sihday of July, 19.97 
For The Canyons For the Osguthorpes 
LssiifiB. Ottsn, President D.A. Osguihan^'Lessor" 
The Csnyons (FonnaDy Wolf Mountain Resort) Q\ # sZ~[ _ ^ ^ 
Blase Cazrig, Managing D i r e a o f . / SssylbsguthoTpe- rf 
The Canyons (Formally Wolf Mountain Resort) 
Sunday River, Atf 
Sufarbush, VT 
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Th& fbHcrt^gagrsamarEisBSSK^amCTdiricaEtoiheAugustK, 1996a£raemeBtb=eTwesa WolfMsanisn 
Cnoxv The Crayons) aad the Osgaiharpe fcsay. This agreement is in sdasdoa to the August 24, 1996 
a g r e e s i s a i and the 5 m smeadment of July 2St 1997. 
3 ) The Canyons will construct and amait i a work access road from the gristing road st BsdPigg Lake 
through the south' end ofsecann 3 towanis the area known as Ninety Nine - 90, Steve Osguthorpe 
and Blaise Csrrig to approve the alignment of the road prior to construction. 
^ ) The Canyons •wQlbc pemafisd to have alpine sla operations (conaBtsnt -with their currant operations) 
on. the north side ofi&teiy Has - 90 and through the southeast comer of section 3. 
3 ) la consaderatioafcr this aassamenl, The Canyons will pay aa additional S50,000.00 in lease payments 
for the term of August W, 1996 sgreemani. 
4") The Canyons aciaiowiedgea that under this Agreement, the August 14,1996 Agreement and the July 
2g, 1997 first amendment to the August 14, 1996 Agreement, the Qsmahoipe family and DJL 
Osgsithojpe have retained the right to use all of the propsny which is the subject of those 
^greeaants, "as pan of their ranch operation {jacludiDE sheap and canla) aud to otherwise use and 
improve suds property, so long as sieh ranch opersiion and other use and impxovetnent$ do not 
damage the towers and other facDsries coostruaed on the-property by the Canyons "(and hs 
predecessors in hnsrest) and do not unreasonably interfere with the usa of-die prtperty in the'winter 
as part of the Canyons' winter skiing operations. The Canyons' agrees that the use of the property 
by the Canyons' during the spring, summer, sad fall, w2i not interfere with the ranch operations of 
the Osguthorpe feinfiy and D.A. Osguthorpe. 
Borli.parjjes agree to work together in good iaHhand maintain open pommunaearion. 
AGREED, GRANTED AND ACCEPTED, this 10th day of Angus!, 1998. 
For "the Canyons For the Osguthorpe 
Ete^CaEdg, Managing £/ 
Director 
The Canyons 









RESTATEMENT OF AGREEMENT 
THIS AGREEMENT is made and entered into this J day of August, 2001, to be 
effective as of August 14, 1996 ('"Effective Date"), by and among D. A. Osguthorpe" 
("Osguthorpe"), D. A Osguthorpe Family Partnership ("Partnership"), D.A. Osguthorpe, as 
trustee of The Dr. D.A. Osguthorpe Trust ("Trust"), Stephen A. Osguthorpe ("S. Osguthorpe") 
and ASC Utah, Inc., a Maine corporation ("ASCU"). Osguthorpe, the Trust, the Partnership, 
S. Osguthorpe, and ASCU are collectively referred to herein as the "Parties", or singly as a 
'Tarry" as the context requires or permits. 
RECITALS: 
A. Osguthorpe, the Trust and/or the Partnership is the owner of certain real property 
consisting of approximately 560 acres as described in annexed Exhibit "A" (the "Property"); 
B. By agreement dated August 14, 1996, Osguthorpe, the Partnership and "Wolf. 
Mountain Resorts, LX.C. (predecessor-in-interest to ASCU) ("Wolf) entered into that certain 
agreement (the "Initial Agreement") under which Osguthorpe and the Partnership granted certain 
rights to Wolf in, to and over the Property for use as a commercial recreational area, including 
the installation, maintenance and operation of two (2) ski lifts, snow making and clearing of ski 
trails and such other related facilities, structures and roads as may be required to allow Wolf to 
use the Property as a commercial recreation area, and Osguthorpe agreed to provide services to 
Wolf; 
C. On July 28, 1997, ASCU, Osguthorpe, the Partnership and S. Osguthorpe entered 
into a certain agreement amending and clarifying certain provisions of the Initial Agreement (the 
'Tirst Amendment"); 
EXHIBIT B 
D. Among other things, the First Amendment provided that ASCU "will include the 
Osguthorpes in their master planning process"; 
E. On August 10, 1998, Osguthorpe, the Partnership, S. Osguthorpe and ASCU 
entered into an agreement (the "Second Amendmenf) (the Initial Agreement, First Amendment 
and Second Amendment are herein referred to collectively as the "Documents") •which amends 
the Initial Agreement and the First Amendment; 
F. On or about May 13,1998, the Trust acquired an interest in the Property; 
G. ASCU is the owner and operator of The Canyons resort and the Property is used 
in ASCU's operations. ASCU intends to expand its operations on the Property and, as it has 
done in the past, ASCU intends to hire personal services of Osguthorpe and/or S. Osguthorpe to 
assist it in the master planning or development of The Canyons resort; 
H. S. Osguthorpe has provided, and agrees to provide in the future, services to ASCU 
to assist ASCU in its master planning and development process for The Canyons resort; 
I. A dispute has arisen between Osguthorpe, the Trust, the Partnership, 
S. Osguthorpe and ASCU regarding, among other tilings, whether the payments under the 
Documents are payments for lease rentals and services rendered or whether the payments are 
solely for lease rentals; 
J. The Parties desire to resolve their disputes by clarifying the provisions of the 
Documents and establishing a process to (i) allocate that portion of the annual payment to the fair 
market value for ASCU's rights in and to the Property and to use the Property as part of its 
operations of The Canyons resort, and (ii)pay for services provided by Osguthorpe and/or 
S. Osguthorpe under the Documents; and 
K. The Parties desire to set forth their understandings and agreements in writing, 
4192273 2 
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NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual agreements and covenants set forth 
herein and for other good and valuable consideration, the receipt, sufficiency and adequacy 
which is hereby acknowledged by each of the Parties, the Parties agree as follows: 
1. Restatement of Documents. The Initial Agreement, First Amendment and Second 
Amendment are hereby amended and restated in their entirety. 
2. Easement Grant. Osguthorpe, the Trust and the Partnership hereby grant, and 
reaffirm the granting of, an easement (the "Easemenf) on, under and over the Property to ASCU 
for use as a commercial recreational area, including the installation, maintenance and operation 
of two (2) ski lifts, snow making and clearing of ski trails and such other related facilities, 
structures and roads as maybe required for such Use. Specifically Saddleback and Doc's Knob 
chair lifts as identified on annexed Exhibit "B", including ski trails servicing Doc's Knob and 
lower sliver ofthe quarter section additionally identified on annexed Exhibit "B". Ski trials, lifts 
and facilities shall not be constructed on the southernmost parcel #6 (40 acres) and parcel #5 (40 
acres) other than those previously identified on the Property as described in annexed 
Exhibit "B'\ 
2.1 The Parties agree and acknowledge that in connection witib the Easement 
ASCU has performed, or is hereby given the right to perform, the following: 
2.1.1 ASCU will construct a jeep/snowmobile road from the top of 
Saddleback towards Red Pine Lake and on toward the bottom of Saddleback area. The road will 
also be continued from the top of Saddleback to the northwest corner of Section 3. 
S. Osguthorpe and Blaise Carrig will approve the alignment prior to construction. 
2.1.2 ASCU will relocate and upgrade the existing Saddleback lift to the 
location approved by S. Osguthorpe and Blaise Carrig. 
419227.3 3 Vn 
2.1.3 ASCU will be able to complete the Saddleback area trail 
construction as approved by S. Osguthorpe and Blaise Carrig. 
2.1.4 ASCU is able to relocate and upgrade the existing Spotted Owl 
chair to the location shown on the attached map. This relocation to be approved by Blaise Carrig 
and S, Osguthorpe. 
2.1.5 ASCU will repair and upgrade the lower jeep road on the Property 
as shown on the attached map for construction and maintenance access; 
2.1.6 ASCU will construct and maintain a road on the Property from 
Red Pine Lake to the top of Tombstone. This road is to be used by the Canyons construction and 
maintenance only. 
2.1.7 ASCU commits to working with Osguthorpe and Partnership to 
ensure that snowmobile and horse riding operation can continue for the entire term of this 
Agreement ASCU is committed to working with Osguthorpe and Partnership to resolve any 
issues of the interference or conflict between these operations and the ski development of The 
Canyons resort 
2.1.8 ASCU can construct a ski trail that crosses the south west comer of 
lot 5 of the Properly quarter section. This trail to be approved by S. Osguthorpe and Blaise 
Carrig. 
2.1.9 ASCU will construct and maintain a work access road from the 
existing road at Red Pine Lake' through the sound end of section 3 towards the area known as 
Ninety Nine - 90 of the Property. S. Osguthorpe and Blaise Carrig to approve the alignment of 
the rod prior to construction. 
419227.3 4 r^ 
2.1.10 ASCU will be permitted to have alpine ski operations (consistent 
with their current operations) on the north side of Ninety Nine - 90 and through the southeast 
comer of section 3 of the Property. 
2.2 ASCU acknowledges that under the Documents Osguthorpe and 
Partnership have retained the right to use all of the Property as part of their ranch operation, 
including, without limitation, grazing and other activities in connection with their sheep and 
cattle operation, and to otherwise use and improve the Property, so long as such ranch operations 
and other use and improvements do not damage the towers or other facilities lawfully 
constructed on the Property by ASCU (or its predecessors-in-interest) and does not unreasonably 
interfere with the use of the Property by ASCU in the winter as part of ASCU's winter skiing 
operations. ASCU agrees that use of the Property during the spring, summer and fall months 
will not interfere with the ranch operations of Osguthorpe and the Partnership. 
2.3 The term of the Easement is for twenty-eight (28) years commencing 
August 14,1996. 
3. Services. Osguthorpe and/or S. Osguthorpe agree to make themselves available 
for consultation and/or render services to ASCU in conjunction with the operation of The 
Canyons resort, the master planning for and the development of The Canyons resort, and such 
other services as are reasonably requested by ASCU and which are necessary for the 
development of The Canyons resort. ASCU agrees that Osguthorpe and/or S. Osguthorpe shall 
have the right to delegate to a third person approved by ASCU those services required of them 
under this Section 3. 
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•4.. Annual Consideration. The total annual aggregate consideration for the Easement 
and services rendered under this Agreement shall be Two Hundred Thousand Dollars 
($200,000). The Parties agree that this total consideration •will be apportioned as follows: 
4.1 Within sixty (60) calendar days prior to August 12, 2001, Osguthorpe, the 
Trust or the Partnership and ASCU shall each have appointed a real estate appraiser (each such 
appraiser shall have no less than ten (10) years' experience) who shall provide appraisals setting 
forth the fair market value of the Easement At or prior to the expiration of such sixty (60) day 
period, the Parties shall, for purposes of establishing Hie fair market value of the Easement, take 
an average of the two (2) appraised values of the Easement and such average shall be the amount 
of consideration to be allocated as payment for the Easement. 
4.2 All of the remaining part of the annual consideration of Two Hundred 
Thousand Dollars ($200,000) shall be allocated to the payment for availability for consultation 
and/or of services rendered under and in accordance with the provisions of Section 3. 
4.3 The annual consideration is due and payable by ASCU to the Osguthorpes 
not later than August 12 of each year. 
5. Mutual Covenants. The Parties mutually covenant and agree as follows: 
5.1 Each Party agrees to work with each other Party in good faith to 
accomplish the intended purposes of this Agreement to maintain open communications. 
5.2 ASCU assumes the obligation to notify Osguthorpe, the Trust and the 
Partnership and to seek their approval of any matters of change to the Property. 
6. Successors and Assigns. This Agreement and its provisions shall be binding upon 
and inure to the benefit of the respective heirs, legal representatives, successors, and assigns of 
each of the Parties. 
419227.3 6 THO 
7. Memorandum of Agreement. Simultaneous with the execution of this Agreement, 
the Parties shall execute and record the Memorandum of Agreement annexed as Exhibit "C". 
8. Counterparts. This Agreement may be executed in counterparts and delivered by 
facsimile. 




D. A. Osguthorpe/^ 
THE PARTNERSHIP: 
D. A. OSGUTHORPE FAMILY PARTNERSHIP 
MA. *&* By:. 
D. A. OsguuiorpX Its Parther1 
S. OSGUTHORPE: 
phen A. Osguthorpe, 
THE TRUST: 
THE DR. D.A. OSGUTHORPE TRUST 
419227.3 1M\ 
ASCU: 
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RESTATEMENT OF AGREEMENT 
Legal Description 
The following described property is located in Summit County, Utah and is more 
particularly described as follows; 
PARCEL 1: 
Lots 3,4,5 and 6, Section 1, Township 2 South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian. 
PARCEL 2: 
Lots 1, 2, 7, 8, 9, 10 and the Southeast VA of Section 3, Township 2 South, Range 3 East, 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
419227,3 A-l 1H3 
EXHIBIT B 
TO 
RESTATEMENT OF AGREEMENT 
Property Map 
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RESTATEMENT OF AGREEMENT 
Memorandum of Agreement 
419227.3 C - l C | \ ^ 
WHEN RECORDED, PLEASE MAIL TO: 
Parsons Behle & Larimer 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Post Office Box 45898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0898 
Attention: Shawn C. Ferrin 
MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that ASC Utah, Inc., a Maine corporation 
("ASCU"); and D. A. Osguthorpe, the D. A Osguthorpe Family Partnership, D.A. Osguthorpe, 
as trustee of The D.A. Osguthorpe Trust, and Stephen A. Osguthorpe ("collectively, 
"Osguthorpe""), have entered into that certain Restatement of Agreement dated August 1, 2001 
("Agreement"), which establishes, among other things, certain rights and obligations by and among 
Osguthorpe and ASCU concerning a certain parcel of real property located in Summit County, Utah 
and more particularly described on Exhibit A attached hereto and incorporated herein by tins 
reference. 
All of the terms and provisions of the Agreement are hereby incorporated herein by 
reference. Additional information regarding the Agreement may be obtained by contacting any of 
the following: 
Party 1: ASC Utah, Inc. 
The Canyons 
4000 The Canyons Resort Drive 
Park City, Utah 84098 
Attention: Managing Director 
Party 2: 
This Memorandum in no way modifies or amends the terms and provisions of the 
Agreement This Memorandum is executed solely for the purpose of providing record notice of 
the Agreement and is to be recorded in the real property records of Summit County, Utah. 
419369^ 
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ADDENDUM 11 
56 Page 1 of 1 
Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, 
at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary 
judgment by the adverse party, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any 
part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is 
sought, may, at any time, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part 
thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be filed and served in accordance with CJA 4-
501. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of 
liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the 
relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before 
it and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what 
material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear 
without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other relief is not in controversy, and 
directing such further proceedings in the action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed 
established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal 
knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is 
competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an 
affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as 
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by 
affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he 
does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for 
reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or 
may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented 
pursuant to this rule are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order the party 
employing them to pay to the other party the amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused him to 
incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
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Rule 64D. Garnishment. 
(a) Availability of writ of garnishment (pre-judgment and after judgment). Except as provided in Rule 64A and as authorized and 
permitted therein a writ of garnishment is available as provided for herein. 
(a)(i) Before judgment. A writ of garnishment is available as a means of attachment before judgment, other than for defendant's 
earnings from personal services as hereinafter defined in Subdivision (d)(vii), at any time after the filing of a complaint in cases 
in which a writ of attachment is available under Rule 64C. 
(a)(ii) After judgment or order. A writ of garnishment is available in aid of execution to satisfy a money judgment or other order 
requiring the payment of money. Such judgments and orders are hereinafter sometimes referred to collectively as "judgment". 
(a)(iii) Property subject to garnishment. The property subject to garnishment that a writ may be used to levy upon or affect is all 
the accrued credits, chattels, goods, effects, debts, choses in action, money and other personal property and rights to property 
of the defendant in the possession of a third person, or under the control or constituting a performance obligation to the 
defendant of any third person, whether due or yet to become due at the time of service of the writ of garnishment, which are not 
exempt from garnishment or exempt under any applicable provisions of state or federal law (hereinafter sometimes referred to 
as "Property Subject to Garnishment"). 
(a)(iv) As used in this Rule 64D, the term "plaintiff" means the person or entity seeking by garnishment to attach or execute 
upon the property of another subject to garnishment and the term "defendant" means the person or entity whose property 
subject to garnishment is sought to be attached or executed upon by the plaintiff. 
(b) Requirements for issuance of a prejudgment writ of garnishment. The clerk shall issue a prejudgment writ or writs of 
garnishment, with or without notice to the defendant, directed to the person(s) sought to be charged as gamishee(s) and so 
identified in the affidavit required by Subdivision (b)(i) herein only upon the order of the court in which the action is filed. Several 
writs may be issued at the same time so long as there is only one named garnishee in a single writ. No writ shall issue unless 
there is attached thereto the fee required by Subdivision (d)(ii). Subject to Rule 64A, the court shall issue its order for the 
issuance of a prejudgment writ of garnishment only upon the occurrence of the following: 
(b)(i) A finding that the plaintiff has filed with the clerk an affidavit briefly setting forth: admissible evidence of facts showing that 
plaintiffs claim is one for which attachment is authorized by Rule 64C; the amount due the plaintiff for which the complaint seeks 
judgment; that plaintiff has good reason to believe and does believe that defendant has Property Subject to Garnishment in the 
possession or in the control of or otherwise owing from one or more specified third persons who plaintiff seeks to charge as 
garnishees or that such third persons plaintiff seeks to charge as garnishees are otherwise indebted to the defendant; and that 
such Property Subject to Garnishment is not earnings for the personal services of the defendant, or otherwise exempt from 
garnishment. 
(b)(ii) A finding that plaintiff has filed with the clerk a bond or undertaking in the form and amount required for the issuance of a 
writ of attachment. 
(b)(iii) Exceptions to the sufficiency of the sureties on plaintiffs prejudgment garnishment bond or undertaking and the 
justification of such sureties shall be made within the times and in the manner and with the effect provided in Rule 64C(c). 
(c) Requirements for issuance of writ of garnishment after judgment or other order. After the entry of a judgment or other order 
requiring the payment of money, the clerk of any court from which execution thereon may be issued shall issue a writ or writs of 
garnishment, without the necessity for an undertaking, upon the filing of an application by the plaintiff: (i) identifying the person 
sought to be charged as a garnishee; (ii) stating whether such property consists in whole or in part of earnings from personal 
services as hereinafter defined in Subdivision (d)(vii) of this rule and (iii) stating the remaining amount due on the judgment. 
Several writs may be issued at the same time so long as there is only one named garnishee in a single writ. No writ shall issue 
unless there is attached thereto the fee required by Subdivision (d)(ii). 
(d) Content and effect of writ; to whom directed (pre-judgment or after judgment). 
(d)(i) The writ of garnishment shall be issued in the name of the State of Utah and shall be directed to the person or persons 
designated in the plaintiffs affidavit or application as garnishee or garnishees, advising each such person that each is attached 
as garnishee in the action, and commanding each of them not to pay or deliver any non-exempt Property Subject to 
Garnishment as defined in Subdivision (a)(iii) herein in their possession, custody or control, or part thereof, due or to become 
due to the defendant up to the amount remaining due on the judgment (Subdivision (c)(iii)) if the writ is issued after judgment or 
the amount claimed to be due the plaintiff (Subdivision (b)(0) if a prejudgment writ is issued, whichever is applicable, and to 
retain possession and control of all such property until further order of the court or as otherwise discharged or released as 
provided for herein. In the case of a prejudgment writ, the writ shall contain a designation that it is a prejudgment writ and further 
note the date and time of expiration of the writ. At the time the writ of garnishment is issued, the clerk shall attach to the writ a 
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notice of garnishment and exemptions, interrogatories to the garnishee and two copies of an application by which the defendant 
may request a hearing. 
(d)(ii) The writ shall require the garnishee to give answers to interrogatories within five (5) business days from the date of 
service of the writ. Service of a copy of the answers to interrogatories shall be made upon the plaintiff and the original filed with 
the clerk. The plaintiff shall provide a fee to the garnishee in an amount set by the Legislature. The interrogatories may in 
substance inquire: (1) whether the garnishee is indebted to the defendant, either in property or in money, whether the same is 
now due and, if not, when it is to become due; (2) whether there is any Property Subject to Garnishment in the possession, 
custody or control of the garnishee and, if so, the value of the same; (3) whether the garnishee knows of any debts owing to the 
defendant, whether due or not, or of any Property Subject to Garnishment belonging to the defendant or in which defendant has 
an interest, whether in the possession or under the control of the garnishee or another, and, if so, the particulars thereof; (4) 
whether the garnishee is retaining or deducting any amount in satisfaction of a claim the garnishee has against the plaintiff or 
the defendant, a designation as to whom such claim relates, and the amount retained or deducted; and (5) as to any other 
relevant information plaintiff may desire, including defendant's job, position or occupation, defendant's rate and method of 
compensation, defendant's pay period and the computation of the amount of defendant's accrued disposable earnings attached 
by the writ. 
(d)(iii) If the garnishee has possession, custody or control of Property Subject to Garnishment, the garnishee shall serve within 
five (5) business days of service of the writ of garnishment upon the garnishee a copy of the writ of garnishment, answers to 
interrogatories, notice of garnishment and exemptions, and two copies of an application by which a hearing may be requested, 
upon: (1) the defendant at the last known address of the defendant shown on the records of the garnishee at the time the writ of 
garnishment was served on the garnishee; and (2) upon any other person shown upon the records of the garnishee to be a co-
owner or having an interest in the property or money garnisheed at the last known address of the co-owner or other interested 
person as shown on the records of the garnishee at the time the writ of garnishment was served on the garnishee. If that which 
is garnisheed is an account, such as a bank account or the like, the copies of the writ of garnishment, answers to 
interrogatories, notice of garnishment and exemptions, and applications for hearing shall be served at the addresses maintained 
in the records of the garnishee for that account. Service shall be by first class mail or by hand delivery to the defendant and all 
others. In the answer to interrogatories, the garnishee shall state that the garnishee has mailed or hand delivered a copy of the 
writ of garnishment, answers to interrogatories, notice of garnishment and exemptions, and two copies of an application by 
which a hearing may be requested to the defendant and all other persons entitled thereto and state the manner and date of 
compliance therewith. 
(d)(iv) The notice of garnishment and exemptions that is to be served upon the defendant and others entitled to its receipt shall 
indicate in substance that certain money is exempt from garnishment including but not limited to, Social Security benefits, 
Supplemental Security Income benefits, Veterans' benefits, unemployment benefits, Workers' Compensation benefits, public 
assistance (welfare), alimony, child support, certain pensions, and part or all of wages or other earnings from personal services. 
The notice shall also indicate that the defendant or other person notified must request a hearing within ten days from the date of 
service of the notice upon the defendant or other person, but in no case later than the time at which the court orders the 
disposition of the Property Subject to Garnishment provided for herein, which shall not be sooner than ten (10) days from the 
service of the notice, if such defendant or other person desires to claim any exemption that has not already been reflected in the 
answers to interrogatories, believes that the writ of garnishment was issued improperly, or that the answers to interrogatories 
are inaccurate. For purposes of this provision, the date of service shall be the date of mailing, if mailed, or date of delivery, if 
hand-delivered, and no period for mailing (Rule 6(e)) shall be used in computing the time period. 
(d)(v) Priority among writs of garnishment served upon a garnishee shall be in order of their service. 
(d)(vi) A writ of garnishment attaching earnings for personal services shall attach only that portion of the defendant's accrued 
and unpaid disposable earnings hereinafter specified. The writ shall so advise the garnishee and shall direct the garnishee to 
withhold from the defendant's accrued disposable earnings only the amount attached pursuant to the writ. Earnings for personal 
services shall be deemed to accrue on the last day of the period in which they were earned or to which they relate. If the writ is 
served before or on the date the defendant's earnings accrue and before the same have been paid to the defendant, the writ 
shall be deemed to have been served at the time the periodic earnings accrued; 
(d)(vii) "Earnings" or "earnings from personal services" means compensation paid or payable for personal services, whether 
denominated as wages, salary, commission, bonus, or otherwise, and includes periodic payments pursuant to a pension or 
retirement program. "Disposable earnings" means that part of a defendant's earnings remaining after the deduction of all 
amounts required by law to be withheld. For purposes of a garnishment to enforce payment of a judgment arising out of a failure 
to support dependent children, earnings also include, in addition to those items listed above, periodic payments pursuant to 
insurance policies of any type, including unemployment compensation, insurance benefit payments, and all gain derived from 
capital, from labor, or from both combined, including profit gained through sale or conversion of capital assets or as otherwise 
modified or adopted by law for the support of dependent children. 
(d)(viii) The maximum portion of the aggregate disposable earnings of defendant (if an individual) becoming due the defendant 
which is subject to garnishment is the lesser of: 
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(d)(viii)(A) Twenty-five per centum of defendant's disposable earnings (fifty per centum for a garnishment to enforce payment of 
a judgment arising out of failure to support dependent children) computed for the pay period for which the earnings accrued; or 
(d)(viii)(B) The amount by which the defendant's aggregate disposable earnings computed for the pay period for which the 
earnings accrued exceeds the number of weeks in the period multiplied by thirty times the federal minimum hourly wage 
prescribed by the Fair Labor Standards Act in effect at the time the earnings are payable. 
(d)(ix) Unless otherwise ordered by the Court, the garnishee shall treat the defendant's earnings becoming due from the 
garnishee as the defendant's entire aggregate earnings for the purpose of computing the sum attached by the garnishment. 
(e) Service of writ; return; general service (pre-judgment or after judgment). The writ, any order pursuant to subdivision(s) of this 
rule, and any order pursuant to Rule 64A(3), shall be served upon the garnishee by a sheriff, constable, deputy, or such other 
person designated by court order and return thereof made in the same manner as a return of service upon a summons. All other 
service may be by first class mail or hand delivery. 
(f) Release or discharge of garnishment (pre-judgment or after judgment). At any time either before or after the service of any 
writ of garnishment, the defendant may obtain a release or discharge thereof in the same manner and under the same 
conditions as a release or discharge of a writ of attachment may be obtained under the provisions of Subdivision (f) of Rule 64C. 
The plaintiff may release a writ of garnishment by filing with the clerk a release of garnishment and serving a copy thereof upon 
the garnishee. 
(g) Answer of garnishee; delivery of property (pre-judgment or after judgment). The garnishee shall, within the time required by 
Subdivision (d)(ii) hereof, serve upon the court and the plaintiff verified answers to the interrogatories and provide proof(s) of 
service upon defendant of the copy of the writ of garnishment, answers to interrogatories, the notice of garnishment and 
exemptions, and the applications by which a hearing may be requested, stating the manner and date of service. The garnishee 
may also deliver to the officer serving the writ the Property Subject to Garnishment as shown by the answer of the garnishee, 
and the officer shall make return of such property and money with the writ to the court, to be dealt with as thereafter ordered by 
the court. Thereupon, the garnishee shall be relieved from further liability in the proceedings, unless the answer shall be 
successfully controverted as hereinafter provided or the garnishee has willfully failed to serve copies of the writ of garnishment, 
answers to interrogatories, notice of garnishment and exemptions, and the applications by which a request for a hearing may be 
made on the defendant and other persons entitled thereto. 
(h) Procedure (pre-judgment or after judgment). The defendant or any other person who owns or claims an interest in the 
property subject to garnishment that is gamisheed may request a hearing to claim any exemption to the garnishment, or to 
challenge the issuance of the writ or the accuracy of the answers to interrogatories. Such request must be filed within ten days 
of the service (for purposes of this provision the date of service shall be the date of mailing if mailed or date of delivery if hand-
delivered and no period for mailing pursuant to Rule 6(e) shall be used in computing the time period) of the copy of the materials 
required to be served by Subdivision (d)(iii) upon the defendant and all others entitled to receive the same. Any person filing a 
request for hearing shall serve a copy of the request for hearing on the plaintiff, the garnishee, and other persons claiming an 
interest in the property. The request for a hearing shall be in a form to enable the defendant or other person to specify the 
grounds upon which the defendant or other person challenges the issuance of the writ or the accuracy of the answers to 
interrogatories, or claims the amount garnisheed to be exempt, in whole or in part, including, but not limited to exemptions 
claimed for Social Security benefits, Supplemental Security Income benefits, Veterans' benefits, unemployment benefits, 
Workers' Compensation benefits, public assistance (welfare) benefits, alimony and child support, pensions, wage or other 
earnings for personal service, and non-ownership of the garnisheed property. Where personal services are compensated, but 
no amounts are required by law to be withheld, the amounts that would have been required to be withheld by law had the 
defendant been an employee of the garnishee are exempt. 
(h)(i) If no request for hearing is filed. If the garnishee does not receive a copy of a request for hearing within 20 days after 
service of copies of materials required to be served by Subdivision (d)(iii), the garnishee shall pay Property Subject to 
Garnishment to plaintiff or plaintiffs attorney. If a request for hearing is not filed as provided for in this Rule and the time for 
doing so has expired and the writ issued was a prejudgment writ of garnishment, then the court or the clerk, upon plaintiffs 
request, shall issue an order to the garnishee to pay the Property Subject to Garnishment into court by delivery of such property 
to the sheriff or constable for that purpose. Property Subject to Garnishment that is paid into court pursuant to a prejudgment 
writ of garnishment or at any time when a request for hearing has been filed shall be held by the clerk pending order of the 
court. 
(h)(ii) Effect of failure to request hearing. If the defendant or any other person to whom the materials required to be served by 
Subdivision (d)(iii) fails to request a hearing as provided for herein, then defendant and such other persons shall be deemed to 
have accepted as correct the garnishee's answers to interrogatories and the amounts stated therein to be not exempt from 
garnishment except as reflected in the answers to interrogatories. 
(h)(iii) If a request for hearing is filed. If a request for hearing is filed by or on behalf of the defendant or by any other person, the 
court shall set the matter for hearing within ten (10) days from the filing of the request and serve notice of that hearing upon all 
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parties and claimants by first class mail. If the court determines at the hearing that the writ was issued improperly, that the 
answers to interrogatories are inaccurate, or that any assets garnisheed are exempt from or are not subject to garnishment, the 
court shall immediately issue an order to the garnishee releasing such assets or portion thereof from the writ of garnishment. If 
the court finds that the assets or a portion thereof are subject to garnishment and not exempt, it shall issue an order to pay the 
Property Subject to Garnishment directly to plaintiff or plaintiffs attorney or as otherwise ordered by the court, except in the case 
of a prejudgment writ of garnishment where the order shall require that such property be paid into court by delivery of such 
property to the sheriff or constable for that purpose. Property Subject to Garnishment that is paid into court shall be held by the 
clerk pending order of the court. 
(h)(iv) If the property is other than money or its equivalent. Where the property is other than money or its equivalent, the court 
shall order that the garnishee deliver such property to the sheriff, constable, deputy, or such other person designated by court 
order. In the case of a writ issued after judgment, the person to whom the property was delivered shall sell as much of such 
property as may be necessary to satisfy the judgment together with costs of the garnishment proceedings and deposit the 
proceeds into court to be distributed by order of the court. Any surplus of such personal property or the proceeds thereof 
necessary to satisfy the writ of garnishment shall be returned to the defendant unless otherwise ordered by a court of competent 
jurisdiction. In the case of a prejudgment writ, the person to whom the property is delivered shall maintain possession of the 
property until further order of the court. 
(i) Reply to answer of garnishee; trial of issues; judgment (pre-judgment or after judgment). The plaintiff or defendant may, 
within 10 days after the service of any answers to interrogatories, file and serve upon the garnishee and the other party to the 
principal action a reply to the whole or any part thereof and may also allege any matters which would charge the garnishee with 
liability except that all claims for exemptions to garnishment or non-ownership of property garnisheed shall be resolved under 
the procedures as otherwise provided for in Subdivision (h) herein. Such new matter in reply shall be taken as denied and the 
matter thus at issue shall be tried in the same manner as other issues of like nature. Judgment shall be entered upon the verdict 
or finding the same as if the garnishee had answered according to such verdict or finding. Costs shall be awarded in 
accordance with the provisions of Rule 54(d). 
p) Proceedings on failure of garnishee to comply with rule (pre-judgment or after judgment). If a garnishee fails to answer 
interrogatories after payment of the required fee, or if any garnishee shall fail to send to the defendant the copy of the writ, 
answers to interrogatories, notice and applications required by Sections (d)(iii) of this Rule, the court may order the garnishee to 
appear before the court and show cause why the garnishee should not be held in contempt therefor and why the court should 
not order the garnishee to pay expenses and costs incurred by other parties to the proceeding as a result of garnishee's failure. 
After the garnishee has been personally served with an order to appear before the court and show cause, the court may make 
such orders as are just. Unless the court finds there was substantial justification for the garnishee's failure or that other 
circumstances make an award of expenses or costs unjust, the court shall order the garnishee to pay reasonable expenses, 
including attorney's fees, incurred as a result of garnishee's failure. 
If a garnishee fails to serve upon the court answers to interrogatories or an Affidavit of Garnishee as to Continuing Garnishment 
but delivers to the court Property Subject to Garnishment, the plaintiff may obtain a release of such property by filing with the 
court 60 days after the writ of garnishment was issued, or, in the case of a continuing garnishment, 60 days after the Property 
Subject to Garnishment was delivered to the court, an Ex Parte Motion to Release Garnishment Funds and by mailing a copy of 
the motion to the defendant. The motion shall state the amount of the property delivered to the court by the garnishee, that the 
garnishee failed to answer the interrogatories or file an Affidavit of Garnishee as to Continuing Garnishment, that 60 days have 
elapsed since the issuance of the writ (or, in the case of a continuing garnishment, 60 days have elapsed since the Property 
Subject to Garnishment was delivered to the court), and that the defendant has made no objection to the garnishment. No 
earlier than 10 days after a copy of the motion is mailed to the defendant, the court may enter an order that the Property Subject 
to Garnishment shall be released to the plaintiff to be applied to the judgment against the defendant. If the defendant objects to 
such release of property, the defendant shall file an objection to the motion with the court prior to the order being entered and 
shall mail a copy of the objection to the plaintiff. The plaintiff shall mail a copy of the executed order to the defendant. 
(k) Release of garnishee for amount paid (pre-judgment or after judgment). Except as provided for herein, a garnishee who acts 
in accordance with this Rule shall be released from all demands by the defendant for all Property Subject to Garnishment that is 
paid, delivered or accounted for by the garnishee pursuant to this Rule. 
(I) Interpleader of third persons (pre-judgment or after judgment). When any person other than the defendant claims or may 
claim that the property held in the possession, custody, or control of the garnishee pursuant to a Writ is not subject to 
garnishment, the court may on motion order that such claimant be interpleaded as a defendant to the garnishment action, and if 
not already subject to the jurisdiction of the court, provide for notice thereof, in such form as the court shall direct, together with 
service of a copy of the order upon such third-party claimant in the manner required for the service of a summons. Thereupon 
the garnishee may pay or deliver to the court such property held pursuant to the Writ, which shall be a complete discharge from 
all liability to any party for the amount so paid or property so delivered. The third-party claimant shall thereupon be deemed a 
defendant to the garnishment action and shall answer within 10 days, setting forth any claim or defense. In case of default, 
judgment may be rendered as in any other cases of default which shall extinguish any claim of such third-party claimant. 
(m) Claims of garnishee against plaintiff or defendant (pre-judgment or after judgment). Every garnishee shall be allowed to 
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retain or deduct out of the Property Subject to Garnishment all demands against the plaintiff and against the defendant of which 
the garnishee could have availed itself if the garnishee had not been served as garnishee, whether the same are at the time due 
or not so long as the claims are liquidated, but only to the extent that the amounts retained and deducted are applied to reduce 
a debt or other obligation of the plaintiff or defendant, except that should such property, otherwise subject to garnishment, be 
held as security for the payment of a debt or other obligation of the defendant to the garnishee, then such property need not be 
applied at that time but must remain subject to being applied at any time pending the payment in full of the debt or other 
obligation. In answering the interrogatories propounded to the garnishee, the garnishee shall specify the amount retained or 
deducted and the person against whom the claim is made. Amounts retained and deducted for amounts owed by the plaintiff to 
the garnishee shall also be applied in reduction of any judgment amount rendered in favor of plaintiff and against defendant. All 
amounts properly garnisheed in excess of those amounts retained or deducted pursuant to this subdivision are subject to 
payment and distribution in accordance with this Rule. 
(n) Liability of garnishee on negotiable instruments (pre-judgment or after judgment). No person shall be liable as garnishee by 
reason of having drawn, accepted, made or endorsed any negotiable instrument which is not in the possession, custody, or 
control of the garnishee at the time of service of the writ of garnishment. 
(o) When garnishee is mortgagee or pledgee (pre-judgment or after judgment). When any Property Subject to Garnishment is 
mortgaged or pledged, or in any way held for the payment of a debt to the garnishee, the plaintiff may obtain an order from the 
court authorizing the plaintiff to pay the total amount of the obligation to the garnishee in accordance with the terms of the 
mortgage, pledge or obligation, and requiring the garnishee to deliver such Property Subject to Garnishment according to the 
order of the court upon payment to such garnishee of the total obligation. 
(p) Where property is held to secure performance of other obligation (pre-judgment or after judgment). If the Property Subject to 
Garnishment secures any obligation other than the payment of money and if the obligation secured does not require the 
personal performance of the defendant and can be performed by the plaintiff or its designee, the court may, upon plaintiffs 
motion, authorize the plaintiff or its designee to perform the obligation or tender performance and that upon such performance, 
or any tender thereof which is refused, the garnishee shall deliver the Property Subject to Garnishment in accordance with the 
order of the Court. 
(q) Disposition of property (pre-judgment or after judgment). The Property Subject to Garnishment under either Subdivision (o) 
or (p) of this Rule or the proceeds from the sale thereof shall be applied to the extent available, first to satisfy any costs of sale, 
then to repay any amount paid by the plaintiff to the garnishee to satisfy the obligation of the defendant to the garnishee, then to 
pay the costs to perform the obligation of the defendant to the garnishee for an obligation other than the payment of money, and 
then to satisfy the writ of garnishment. 
(r) Order against garnishee for debt not due (pre-judgment or after judgment). When an order is made requiring a garnishee to 
pay an amount to the plaintiff or plaintiffs attorney or into court or otherwise provide property for disposition by the court and the 
same is not yet due to the defendant, payment or providing of property shall not be required until such payment or property is 
otherwise due the defendant from the garnishee. 
(s) Failure to proceed against garnisheed property (pre-judgment or after judgment). Notwithstanding any other provision of this 
Rule, if a plaintiff fails, within sixty days from the filing of the garnishee's answers to interrogatories, to secure and personally 
serve on the garnishee an order requiring the garnishee to pay the property garnisheed into court or as otherwise provided 
herein, then the writ, which commanded the garnishee to hold the amount or property, shall be released and the garnishee 
discharged without further order of the court. If the Property Subject to Garnishment or any part thereof has been deposited with 
the court and the writ of garnishment was issued in aid of the execution of a judgment or order for the payment of money, and 
the plaintiff fails, within sixty days from the filing of the garnishee's answers to interrogatories, to request a release of the 
property garnisheed from the court in accordance with Subdivision (h)(i), then the writ shall be released; the garnisheed property 
shall be returned to the garnishee; and the garnishee discharged without further order of the court. Property Subject to 
Garnishment deposited with the court pursuant to a prejudgment writ of garnishment shall be released only upon order of the 
court. A release under this subdivision may be stayed upon order of the court for good cause shown. Such order shall not be 
binding upon the garnishee until served upon it. 
(t) Costs (pre-judgment or after judgment). 
(t)(i) Costs shall be allowed as a matter of course to the plaintiff and against the defendant in the pursuit of any garnishee action 
instituted after judgment unless the court otherwise directs; provided, however, where an appeal or other proceeding for review 
is taken, costs of the garnishee action shall abide the final determination of the cause. Costs against the State of Utah, its 
officers and agencies shall be imposed only to the extent permitted by law. 
(t)(ii) The plaintiff must serve upon the defendant a copy of a memorandum of the items of necessary costs and disbursements 
in the garnishee action or actions, and file with the court a like memorandum duly verified stating that the items are correct, the 
disbursements have been necessarily incurred in the garnishee action, and the items of costs have not been claimed in any 
previous memorandum. The memorandum or memoranda may be filed at any time after judgment is rendered but in no event 
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later than five days after the receipt of funds that would pay the judgment in full but for the payment of any costs associated with 
a garnishee action for which a memorandum or memoranda have not been filed with the court. A party dissatisfied with the 
costs claimed, may, within seven days after service of the memorandum of costs of the garnishee action, file a motion to have 
the costs taxed by the court. 
(t)(iii) All costs incurred in garnishee actions prior to the rendering of a judgment shall be taxed according to Rule 54(d) of these 
rules. 
(u)(i) A garnishment issued to enforce a judgment obtained by the Office of Recovery Services, within the Department of Social 
Services, for repayment of overpayments, as defined in Utah Code Section 62A-11-202 or by the Department of Workforce 
Services for repayment of overpayments as defined in Utah Code Section 35A-3-602, shall continue to operate and require the 
garnishee to withhold the nonexempt portion of disposable earnings, as defined in Utah Code Subsection 62A-11-103(4), at 
each succeeding earnings disbursement interval until the garnishment is released in writing by the court, the Office of Recovery 
Services, or the Department of Workforce Services. 
(u)(ii) The garnishment described in Subdivision (u)(i) may not exceed 25% of disposable earnings, as defined in Utah Code 
Subsection 62A-11-103(4), or the amount permitted under Section 303(a) of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. 
Section 1673(a), whichever is less. 
(v) Writ of continuing garnishment on earnings. 
(v)(i) "Continuing garnishment" means any procedure for withholding the earnings of a defendant for successive pay periods for 
payment of a judgment debt, other than a judgment for support. "Earnings" and "Disposable Earnings" shall have the meaning 
set forth in Subdivision (d) of this rule. In addition to garnishment proceedings otherwise available under this rule, in any case in 
which a money judgment is obtained in a court of competent jurisdiction, the plaintiff or plaintiffs assignee shall be entitled, in 
accordance with this subdivision, to have the clerk of the court issue a writ of continuing garnishment against any garnishee who 
may owe earnings to the defendant. The person who serves a writ of continuing garnishment, together with the notices required 
by this rule, on the garnishee shall note the date and time of such service on the copy served. A writ of continuing garnishment 
shall be subject to the same exemptions from garnishment and portion of aggregate disposable earnings of defendant subject to 
garnishment as are described in Subdivision (d) of this rule. 
(v)(ii) To the extent that the earnings are not exempt from garnishment, the writ of continuing garnishment shall be a continuing 
lien on all disposable earnings due or to become due to the defendant from the date of service of the writ and continuing until 
the earlier of the following events: 
(v)(ii)(A) 120 days has expired from the date of service of the writ or, in the case of multiple garnishments, 120 days from the 
date a garnishment becomes effective as described hereafter in Subdivision (v)(iii); 
(v)(ii)(B) the end of the last pay period after the defendant's employment relationship is terminated; 
(v)(ii)(C) the underlying judgment is stayed, vacated or satisfied in full; 
(v)(ii)(D) the plaintiff releases the garnishment; or 
(v)(ii)(E) the writ of continuing garnishment is dismissed, vacated, or stayed by a court of competent jurisdiction. 
The plaintiff shall notify the garnishee in writing by first class mail within 5 days after a judgment is stayed, vacated, or satisfied 
or a writ of continuing garnishment is dismissed, vacated, or stayed by the court. 
(v)(iii) Only one writ of garnishment (continuing or otherwise) shall be in effect and satisfied at one time. When more than one 
writ of garnishment has been issued against earnings due the same defendant and served on the same garnishee, the writs 
shall be satisfied in the order of service on the garnishee. Upon expiration of a writ of continuing garnishment, as provided in 
Subdivision (v)(ii) above, any other writ of continuing garnishment that has been issued and served upon a garnishee against 
earnings due the defendant shall then become effective and shall continue for the period described in Subdivision (v)(ii) above. 
No plaintiff may have issued more than one writ of continuing garnishment against the same earnings of any individual 
defendant during the term of the lien created by any writ of continuing garnishment previously issued and served in favor of that 
plaintiff. Any writ of continuing garnishment served upon a garnishee while any previous writ is still in effect shall be answered 
by the garnishee with a statement that the garnishee has been served previously with one or more writs of garnishment against 
earnings and specifying the date on which all such liens previously served are expected to terminate. 
(v)(iv) Garnishee shall answer any interrogatories and serve upon the defendant information as required by Subdivisions (d) and 
(g) of this rule. Thereafter, the defendant shall have the right to request a hearing as provided in Subdivision (h) of this rule. If 
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garnishee does not receive a copy of a request for hearing within 20 days after service of copies of materials required to be 
served by Subdivision (d)(iii), garnishee shall pay Property Subject to Garnishment from the first applicable pay period to plaintiff 
or plaintiffs attorney. Any hearing requested by the defendant outside of that provided for in Subdivision (h) shall be requested 
by motion to the court and held within the judge's sole discretion. Unless the writ shall terminate pursuant to Subdivision (v)(ii) 
above or unless a request for hearing has been served on the garnishee but there has been no subsequent court order, within 
10 days after the end of each subsequent pay period, the garnishee shall deliver the Property Subject to Garnishment either to 
the plaintiff or to the plaintiffs attorney, together with an affidavit which shall state (1) whether the garnishee is indebted to the 
defendant for earnings, specifying the beginning and ending dates of the applicable pay period, and the total earnings for the 
pay period; (2) whether garnishee is retaining or deducting any amount in satisfaction of a claim the garnishee has against the 
plaintiff or the defendant, a designation as to whom such claim relates, and the amount retained or deducted; (3) the 
computation of the amount of defendant's accrued disposable earnings attached by the writ for the applicable pay period; and 
(4) that garnishee has served defendant with a copy of the writ of garnishment and notice of garnishment and exemptions as 
required by Subdivision (d) of this rule. Proceedings on failure of garnishee to comply with this Subdivision (v) shall follow 
Subdivision (j) of this rule. Reply to any answer or affidavit of garnishee completed pursuant to this Subdivision (v) shall follow 
Subdivision (i) of this rule. 
(v)(v) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Subdivision (v), a writ of continuing garnishment issued to enforce a judgment 
obtained by the Office of Recovery Services, within the Department of Social Services, shall have priority over any other writ of 
continuing garnishment in accordance with Subdivision (u) of this rule. If a writ of continuing garnishment issued by the Office of 
Recovery Services is served during the term of a lien created by any other writ of continuing garnishment, the term of that lien 
shall be tolled and all priorities preserved until the expiration of the Office of Recovery Services writ. 
(v)(vi) The plaintiff shall be responsible for insuring that the amounts garnished do not exceed the amount due on the judgment. 
(v)(vii) Except as specifically noted in this Subdivision (v), all other provisions of this rule apply to this subdivision. 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE 
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Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. 
United States District Court, District of Columbia. 
AMERICAN SECURITY BANK, N.A., Plaintiff, 
v. 
John C. YORK, Jr., et al., Defendants. 
John C. YORK, Jr., et al., Counterclaimants, 
v. 
AMERICAN SECURITY BANK, N.A., 
Counterdefendant. 
Civ. A. No. 91-1212(GHR). 
Sept. 1,1992. 
Joseph J. Levin, Jr., Johanna F. Chanin, Colton and 
Boykin, Washington, D.C., for plaintiff. 
David R. Kunev. Paul A. Kaplan, David & Hagner, 
P.C., Washington, D.C., for 
defendants/counterclaimants. 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 
REVERCOMB, District Judge. 
*1 This matter is before the Court on plaintiff and 
counterdefendant American Security Bank, N.A.'s 
("ASB") Motion for Summary Judgment. Defendants 
and counterclaimants are John C. York, Jr. ("York"), 
Michael I. Lipson ("Lipson"), Geraldine A. York, and 
Ronnie H. Lipson. Ms. York and Ms. Lipson are the 
spouses, respectively, of John C. York, Jr. and 
Michael I. Lipson. ASB seeks summary judgment 
on its action to recover $12,000,000.00 plus accrued 
interest, late charges, reasonable attorneys fees and 
costs based on defendants' default upon a promissory 
note. Plaintiffs also seek summary judgment on the 
counterclaim, which alleges breach of contract, 
promissory estoppel, and breach of duty of good faith 
on the part of ASB. Jurisdiction rests upon the 
parties' diversity of citizenship. Upon consideration 
of the parties' briefs, supporting documents, and oral 
arguments, and for the reasons set forth below, the 
Court will deny plaintiffs Motion. 
I. American Security Bank's Claim 
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ASB's claim arises out of a promissory note ("the 
Note") in the principal amount of $13,500,000, which 
York, Lipson, and their spouses executed and 
delivered to ASB on January 31, 1989. Defendants 
subsequently executed and delivered, on March 30, 
1990, an amended and restated note ("the Amended 
Note") in the same principal amount, which provided 
for eleven quarterly payments of principal in 
installments of $400,000.00 each, with the first 
payment to be made on March 31, 1991. It is 
undisputed that defendants failed to make the first 
$400,000 payment. Under the terms of the Amended 
Note, this default, which to the Court's knowledge 
has not been cured, triggered a 5% late charge on the 
delinquent payment, an acceleration clause for the 
entire principal amount, and a provision obligating 
defendants to pay costs of collection, including 
reasonable attorneys fees. 
Notwithstanding this default, the Court believes that 
summary judgment in ASB's favor is inappropriate 
because defendants have raised a genuine issue of 
material fact on their Equal Credit Opportunity Act 
defense through the affidavits and depositions 
accompanying their opposition to plaintiffs Motion. 
See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett. All U.S. 317. 324 
(1986): Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Put differently, the 
Court is well satisfied, having reviewed the parties' 
briefs and supporting documentation, that there is 
considerably more than a "scintilla" of evidence in 
defendants' favor, thus precluding this Court from 
saying that plaintiffs "must prevail as a matter of 
law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc.. All U.S. 242. 
251-52(1976). 
The Equal Credit Opportunity Act ("ECOA"), 15 
U.S.C. § § 1691-1691f. provides in pertinent part 
that "[i]t shall be unlawful for any creditor to 
discriminate against any applicant, with respect to 
any aspect of a credit transaction ... on the basis of... 
sex or marital status." 15 U.S.C. S 1691(a)(1). The 
Federal Reserve Board, pursuant to the ECOA, 15 
U.S.C. § 1691b(a). has promulgated Regulation B, 
which provides that "a creditor shall not require the 
signature of an applicant's spouse or other person, 
other than a joint applicant, on any credit instrument 
if the applicant qualifies under the creditor's 
standards of creditworthiness for the amount and 
terms of the credit requested." 12 C.F.R. § 
202.7(d)(1) (1992) (emphasis added). The statute 
defines an "applicant" as meaning "any person who 
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applies to a creditor directly for an extension, 
renewal, or continuation of credit, or applies to a 
creditor indirectly by use of an existing credit plan 
for an amount exceeding a previously established 
credit limit." 15 U.S.C. S 1691aCb1. The Federal 
Reserve Board, by regulation, has included in this 
definition persons who have received extensions of 
credit, as well as those applying for credit in the first 
instance. See 12 C.F.R. S 2Q2.2fe-> (1992V fFNll 
*2 Defendants put forward facts showing that York 
and Lipson became applicants for a $13,500,000 loan 
from ASB, which was the basis of the Note of 
January 31, 1989, through discussions with Larry 
Pendleton, a Vice President of ASB with supervisory 
responsibilities for the bank's Mortgage Warehousing 
Division. See York Aff. f 6; York Dep. at 100-01; 
Pendleton Dep. at 6. At the time they became 
applicants for this loan, York and Lipson were the 
sole owners of York Associates, which was engaged 
in the origination, sale, and servicing of multifamily 
housing mortgages. See York Aff. \ f 2-3. York 
and Lipson also owned substantially all of the stock 
of First Commonwealth Savings Bank ("First 
Commonwealth"), a Virginia savings and loan 
institution. See id. f 6. York Associates was a 
customer of ASB during the 1980s, having opened a 
line of credit with ASB's Mortgage Warehousing 
Division in 1983 for use in York Associates' 
mortgage banking business. See id. \ f 3-4. 
It was through this business relationship with ASB 
that York came to discuss with Larry Pendleton, the 
ASB banker, York Associates' need for a loan to put 
additional capital into the firm. See id. f 6. 
According to York's sworn affidavit and his 
deposition testimony, Pendleton expressed an interest 
in ASB making this loan to York Associates and 
indicated that ASB would not require that York and 
Lipson pledge their shares in First Commonwealth 
stock as collateral, which York and Lipson were 
reluctant to do. See id.; York Dep. at 100-01. 
York's testimony, however, is that, at the time this 
loan was discussed, Pendleton stated that ASB would 
require the signatures of Geraldine York and Ronnie 
Lipson, as well as those of their husbands, before it 
would make the loan. See York Dep. at 101; York 
Aff. U 7. This requirement was imposed apparently 
before ASB had undertaken any study of the 
creditworthiness of the applicants York and Lipson. 
ASB has not disputed that its officer required the 
signatures of Ronnie Lipson and Geraldine York 
before the bank undertook an analysis of York's and 
Lipson's creditworthiness or that York and Lipson 
met its standards of creditworthiness for this 
particular loan. Rather, ASB suggests that the 
defendants were joint applicants and that the loan 
was "used in substantial part to pay off an already-
existing personal loan to all four borrowers, including 
Mrs. York and Mrs. Lipson." PL's Reply at 4. 
Defendants have produced evidence that the loan 
was a loan to York Associates, in which Ms. York 
and Ms. Lipson had no ownership interest and played 
no role in the loan negotiations. See York Aff. f f 
2, 5, 9; Carlson Dep. at 24; Rice Dep. at 28; 
Geraldine York Dep. at 85. Defendants have also 
produced evidence suggesting that ASB did not 
seriously look to the personal assets of Ronnie 
Lipson and Geraldine York or to assets held jointly 
with their husbands as sources of repayment. ASB's 
account officer for York Associates, Lisa F. Carlson, 
testified in her deposition that, at the time the loan 
was initially made, ASB looked chiefly for collateral 
to the anticipated sale of York Associates to 
Dominion International PLC and then to the sale of 
the firm's servicing portfolio, considering the Yorks' 
and Lipsons' personal income and assets only as a 
tertiary source of repayment. See Carlson Dep. at 
31, 33. A contemporaneous inter-office 
communication from Lisa Carlson, outlining the 
details of the $13,500,000 loan to York Associates, 
confirms that ASB looked primarily for repayment to 
the sale of the firm, and does not mention at all the 
joint personal assets of the Yorks and the Lipsons or 
the assets of Geraldine York and Ronnie Lipson as 
sources of collateral. See Defs.' Exh. I (dated 
January 18, 1989). When the anticipated sale of the 
firm to Dominion PLC fell through and the loan's 
terms were renegotiated, the parties ultimately agreed 
that York and Lipson would pledge their shares in 
First Commonwealth as collateral for the Amended 
Note. See PL's Exh. 14 (Stock Pledge Agreement 
dated March 30, 1990); Carlson Dep. at 78. 
*3 Not only does the evidence above suggest that 
Ms. York and Ms. Lipson were not joint applicants, it 
also suggests that York and Lipson qualified "under 
the creditor's standards of creditworthiness for the 
amount and terms of the credit requested." 12 C.F.R. 
§ 202.7(d)(1). Were a trier of fact to agree with 
defendants' characterization of the facts, it would 
follow that ASB violated the ECOA when it required 
the signatures of Ms. Lipson and Ms. York on the 
1989 Note and the 1990 Amended Note. See Marine 
American State Bank v. Lincoln. 433 N.W.2d 709, 
712 (Jowa 1988). While a fuller development of the 
record may convince a trier of fact that ASB's 
characterization of the loan is accurate, at this stage 
of the litigation it is not the task of the Court to 
"weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the 
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matter but to determine whether there is a genuine 
issue for trial." Anderson. All U.S. at 249. 
ASB's other objections to defendants' ECOA defense 
are unpersuasive. While it may be true, as plaintiff 
argues, that the intent of the ECOA was to protect 
married women who sought credit independent of 
their husbands, it has long been held that the plain 
language of the statute outlaws discrimination 
"against any applicant, with respect to any aspect of a 
credit transaction, which is based on marital status." 
Markham v. Colonial Morteaee Serv. Co.. Assocs.. 
Inc.. 605 F.2d 566. 569 (T>.C.Cir.l9791. 
The Court is also unpersuaded mat paragraphs 5 and 
9 of the opinion letter issued by defendants' counsel, 
or the attached certification, constitute admissions on 
the part of defendants that ASB complied with the 
provisions of the ECOA. The tenor of those 
documents is that execution of the loan documents 
will not violate any duty imposed on the borrowers, 
while paragraph 5(a) of the opinion letter states that 
"[t]he enforceability [of the loan documents, security 
documents and the credit facility letter] may be 
limited by ... other laws of general applicability 
affecting the rights of creditors." PL's Exh. 10, at 6 
(emphasis added). The ECOA is just such a law. 
Finally, while the parties agree that the ECOA may 
be raised as an affirmative defense, see In re 
Remimton. 19 B.R. 718. 719-20 (D.Colo. 19821. 
plaintiff contends that defendants' assertion of this 
defense must fail because they have not alleged 
damages or requested relief under the Act. See PL's 
Reply at 3. On the contrary, the Answer of York and 
Lipson to the Amended Complaint plainly indicates 
that the ECOA is being asserted as a defense to 
liability on the Amended Note. The statute, 
moreover, provides for equitable and declaratory 
relief if necessary to enforce the Act's requirements. 
See 15 U.S.C. § 1961e(c). While one court has 
found no authority for the proposition that a violation 
of the ECOA renders an instrument void, see 
Diamond v. Union Bank and Trust of Bartlesville. 
116 F.Supp. 542. 544 fN.D.Okl. 19911. that court did 
not consider the language or effect of section 
1691e(c). The question whether the ECOA may be 
asserted as a defense to liability has not been 
addressed by our court of appeals and this Court is 
unprepared, in the face of the broadly remedial 
language of section 1961e(c), to say that such a 
defense must fail as a matter of law. The assertion 
of an ECOA defense, moreover, has been found to 
support an award of damages in the nature of 
recoupment in the event a violation of the Act is 
found. See In re Remimton. 19 B.R. at 720-21: 
Marine American State Bank. 433 N.W.2d at 712. 
In short, the Court is of the view that defendants' 
assertion of an ECOA defense entitles them, at the 
very least, to put on proof of damages by way of 
recoupment in the event it is proved that ASB 
violated the Act. 
*4 Thus, on review of the record before it, the Court 
finds that defendants have pointed to disputed issues 
of material fact regarding ASB's possible violation of 
the ECOA which show the need for a trial and which 
warrant denial of plaintiffs summary judgment 
motion. The Court will also deny summary 
judgment on the issue of plaintiffs damage claim, 
because defendants have disputed the amount of 
interest and reasonable attorneys' fees. See Lipson 
Aff.lf 3-6. 
II. The Counterclaim 
ASB also seeks summary judgment on defendants' 
and counterclaimants' counterclaim for breach of 
contract, promissory estoppel and breach of the duty 
of good faith. In brief, the counterclaim alleges that 
York and Lipson agreed to pledge their shares in First 
Commonwealth as additional collateral for the 
Amended Note upon the understanding and promise 
that ASB would subsequently assist them in the 
formation of a holding company to own First 
Commonwealth stock and would agree to a stock 
swap of First Commonwealth shares for shares in the 
holding company. York and Lipson claim that, after 
they had pledged their First Commonwealth shares 
and executed the Amended Note, ASB reneged on its 
promise. There is no dispute that the alleged 
promise to York and Lipson was made, if at all, 
orally. 
Plaintiff argues that it is entitled to summary 
judgment because the loan documents-including the 
Amended Note and Stock Pledge Agreement-
constitute a fully integrated agreement, against which 
parol evidence of an alleged prior oral side agreement 
inconsistent with the terms of the loan documents is 
inadmissible. See PL's Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for 
SummJ. at 21-23; PL's Reply at 13-16. That would 
be the case if the evidence showed that the parties 
intended the loan documents to constitute the entire 
contract. See Dominion Bank. N.S. v. Moore. 688 
F.SUPP. 1084. 1086 (W.D.Va. 19881: Stamenich v. 
Markovic. 462 A.2d 452. 455 (D.C.APP.19831: 
Giotis v. Lampkin. 145 A.2d 779. 781 
(D.CMun.App.19581. Under the theory of partial 
integration, however, parol evidence would be 
admissible to prove the agreement alleged in the 
counterclaim if the language and conduct of the 
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parties and the surrounding circumstances showed 
that the parties did not intend "that the writing 
embrace their agreement on the subject in question." 
Giotis. 145 A.2d at 781. 782. 
As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that neither 
the Note, nor the Amended Note, nor the Stock 
Pledge Agreement contains an integration clause like 
that in the case cited by plaintiff. See Dominion 
Bank. 688 F.Supp. at 1086. While the absence of 
such a clause is merely probative on the question of 
the parties' intent, defendants and counterclaimants 
provide additional evidence in affidavits and 
depositions on the interrelation of the loan and the 
agreement that is the subject of the counterclaim. 
Specifically, defendants and counterclaimants submit 
evidence that, prior to the execution of the Amended 
Note in March of 1990, York and Lipson were 
attempting to form the bank holding company for 
First Commonwealth and requested that the 
restructuring of the ASB loan be delayed until the 
holding company could be formed and approved by 
government regulators, at which point they would 
pledge stock in the holding company as collateral for 
the restructured loan. See York Aff. % 1 18-22; 
York Dep. at 212, 214; Carlson Dep. at 111-12. 
York has testified that, at the request of Larry 
Pendleton, he and Lipson agreed to pledge First 
Commonwealth stock because ASB wanted to 
restructure the loan prior to an impending bank 
examination. See York Aff. | f 23-25; York Dep. 
at 230-32, 300-01; Lipson Dep. at 102-03. In 
agreeing to restructure the loan before the holding 
company could be formed, York claims to have relied 
on his longstanding relationship of trust and course of 
dealing with Pendleton, as well as the oral assurances 
of ASB's president, that the bank would subsequently 
help York and Lipson form the holding company and 
agree to a stock swap. See York Aff. f f 224-30; 
York Dep. at 227, 300-01; Lipson Dep. at 103-05; 
Rice Dep. at 92-93, 94. According to York, after the 
execution of the Amended Note ASB declined to 
assist in the formation of the holding company and 
refused to release its lien on First Commonwealth 
shares so that the stock swap could take place. See 
York Dep. at 243-44, 252-55. Viewing these factual 
allegations in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party, see Luian v. National Wildlife Ass'n. 
110 S.Ct. 3177. 3188 (1990). the Court is satisfied 
that defendants and counterclaimants have raised 
material issues of triable fact both as to intent of the 
parties and to the very existence of the oral 
agreement. Summary judgment on the counterclaim 
is therefore inappropriate. 
plaintiff ASB's Motion for Summary Judgment on its 
Amended Complaint and the Counterclaim is 
DENIED. 
The Court will hold a status conference at 9:00 a.m. 
on October 27, 1992, at which counsel for the parties 
shall attend, for the purpose of setting a trial date. 
SO ORDERED. 
FN1. This definition reads as follows: 
Applicant means any person who requests or 
who has received an extension of credit 
from a creditor, and includes any person 
who is or may become contractually liable 
regarding an extension of credit. For 
purposes of § 202.7(d). the term includes 
guarantors, sureties, endorsers and similar 
parties. 
12C.F.R.S 202.2(e) (1992). 
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*5 Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, 
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Enoch Richard Smith, as personal representative of the Estate of 
Enoch Smith Jr., Plaintiff and Appellee, v. D.A. Osguthorpe, an 
individual; and D.A. Osguthorpe Family Partnership, Defendants and 
Appellants. 
Case No. 20010530-CA 
COURT OF APPEALS OF UTAH 
2002 UT App 361; 58 P.3d 854; 459 Utah Adv. Rep. 22; 2002 Utah 
App. LEXIS 110 
October 31,2002, Filed 
PRIOR HISTORY: 
[***1] Third District, Salt Lake Department. 
The Honorable Glenn Iwasaki. 
DISPOSITION: 
Affirmed in part, and reversed and remanded in 
part. 
COUNSEL: 
David W. Scofield, Salt Lake City, for 
Appellants. 
Hardin A. Whitney and Robert G. Wing, Salt 
Lake City, for Appellee. 
JUDGES: 
Judith M. Billings, Associate Presiding Judge. 
WE CONCUR: Norman H. Jackson, Presiding 
Judge, William A. Thorne Jr., Judge. 
OPINIONBY: 
Judith M. Billings 
OPINION: 
[**855] 
BILLINGS, Associate Presiding Judge: 
[*P1] D.A. Osguthorpe and the D.A. 
Osguthorpe Family Partnership (collectively 
the Osguthorpes) appeal the district court's 
grant of Enoch Richard Smith's motions for 
summary judgment and denial of the 
Osguthorpes' motions for summary judgment, 
to dismiss, and to amend. We affirm in part, 
and reverse and remand in part. 
BACKGROUND 
[*P2] Prior to 1966, Enoch Smith Jr. (Smith) 
nl and D.A. Osguthorpe (Osguthorpe) were 
partners in a cattle and sheep business (the 
partnership). In November 1966, Smith and 
Osguthorpe entered into an agreement (the 
dissolution agreement) "to settle all of the 
rights between them in the partnership 
businesses and affairs." 
nl Enoch Richard Smith filed this 
action as the representative of the estate 
of his father, Enoch Smith Jr., who died 
on November 11, 1996. For convenience 
we refer to the two as Smith. 
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property provided the Osguthorpes did "not 
interfere with ski lifts and similar structures 
[* * *2] and runs of Wolf Mountain. 
[*P3] Under the dissolution agreement, Smith 
agreed to sell Osguthorpe his interest in the 
partnership assets, subject to a reservation by 
Smith of a share of proceeds derived from the 
sale or lease of property (the disputed 
property), which is the subject of this appeal. In 
return, Osguthorpe agreed to pay Smith $ 
50,000 and to assume partnership obligations. 
[*P4] Smith and Osguthorpe signed the 
dissolution agreement. Additionally, 
Osguthorpe's wife signed under a clause 
providing that "I... agree that any interest that I 
may have in and to the [disputed property] 
[**856] shall be subject to the provisions of 
said paragraph 1 (g)" of the dissolution 
agreement. In January 1967, the dissolution 
agreement was recorded in the Summit County 
Recorder's Office. 
[*P5] Sometime after entering into the 
dissolution agreement, Osguthorpe conveyed 
part of the disputed property to the D.A. 
Osguthorpe Family Partnership (the family 
partnership). The family partnership included 
Osguthorpe's son Stephen. 
[*P6] On August 14, 1996, Osguthorpe and 
the family partnership entered into a twenty-
eight-year agreement with Wolf Mountain 
Resorts, L.C. (Wolf Mountain) titled [***3] 
"Lease Agreement" (the lease). Under the 
lease, Wolf Mountain agreed to annually pay 
the Osguthorpes $ 100,000 to "lease[] ... 
specific portions" of the Osguthorpes' property, 
including the disputed property, "for use as a 
commercial recreation area, including the 
installation, maintenance and operation of two 
ski lifts, snow making and clearing of ski trails 
and such other related facilities, structures and 
roads as may be required." The lease also 
required Wolf Mountain to permit the 
Osguthorpes "to improve and to use" the 
[*P7] Sometime in 1997, American Skiing 
Company (the Canyons) succeeded to Wolf 
Mountain's interest in the lease. On July 28, 
1997, the Canyons, Osguthorpe, the family 
partnership, and Stephen, as an individual, 
amended the lease. This first amendment 
granted the Canyons the right to construct a ski 
trail, and the right to repair and construct 
additional roads and relocate and upgrade lifts 
subject to the approval of Stephen and the 
Canyons' director. The amendment required the 
Canyons to "include the Osguthorpes in their 
master planning [***4] process." The 
amendment also increased the annual rent to $ 
150,000. 
[*P8] On August 10, 1998, the lease was 
amended a second time. This second 
amendment gave the Canyons the right to have 
alpine skiing operations and to construct 
another road subject to the approval of Stephen 
and the Canyons* director. The Osguthorpes 
retained the right to use and improve all of the 
property for their sheep and cattle ranching 
operations, so long as the same did not damage 
the Canyons' facilities or unreasonably interfere 
with the Canyons' winter use of the property. 
The amendment increased the annual payment 
to $ 200,000. 
[*P9] In November 1998, Enoch Richard 
Smith, as representative of Enoch Smith Jr.'s 
estate, brought a breach of contract action 
against the Osguthorpes, seeking a share of the 
lease payments. Smith filed a motion for partial 
summary judgment, contending the dissolution 
agreement entitled him to a share of the lease 
payments. The Osguthorpes filed a cross-
motion for summary judgment, contending the 
dissolution agreement was unenforceable. 
Following a hearing, the district court granted 
Smith's motion for partial summary judgment. 
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[*P10] Thereafter, [***5] the Osguthorpes' 
counsel withdrew and newly associated counsel 
filed a motion to reconsider the grant of partial 
summary judgment to Smith, asserting the 
dissolution agreement was unenforceable for 
want of consideration and under the statute of 
frauds. The Osguthorpes' new counsel also 
filed a second motion to amend their answer to 
assert, inter alia, fraud defenses and 
counterclaims. The district court denied the 
Osguthorpes' motion to reconsider, ruling that 
the dissolution agreement was integrated and 
satisfied the statute of frauds. The district court 
did not address the Osguthorpes' motion to 
amend. 
[*Pll] Smith filed a second motion for 
summary judgment seeking damages of one-
half of the lease payments in excess of $ 1.60 
per acre. In response, the Osguthorpes asserted 
the lease payments were mainly for services 
rendered by Osguthorpe and Stephen, thus a 
material issue of fact existed as to the 
allocation of payments due Smith. The district 
court granted Smith's requested damages, 
concluding the lease payments were entirely for 
use of the disputed property not for services. 
[*P12] The Osguthorpes then filed a motion 
to dismiss for failure to join Stephen and 
[***6] the Canyons as indispensable parties. 
The district court refused to grant or deny the 
motion. Instead, the court ruled that although 
[**857] the Canyons and Stephen did not have 
an interest in Smith's action generally, they had 
an interest with respect to its ruling that the 
lease payments were not for services. The court 
therefore invited the Canyons and Stephen to 
file memoranda in opposition to Smith's second 
motion for summary judgment. 
[*P13] The Osguthorpes now appeal the grant 
of Smith's motions for summary judgment and 
the denial of their motions for summary 
judgment, to dismiss, and to amend their 
answer. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
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[*P14] The Osguthorpes argue the district 
court erred in granting Smith's motions for 
summary judgment. 
Summary judgment is appropriate only 
when there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. In determining 
whether the [district] court correctly found that 
there was no genuine issue of material fact, we 
accept the facts and inferences in the light most 
favorable to the [nonmoving] party. In deciding 
whether the [district] court correctly granted 
judgment [***7] as a matter of law, we give 
no deference to the [district] court's view of the 
law; we review it for correctness. 
SME Indus., Inc. v. Thompson, Ventulett, 
Stainback & Assocs., 2001 UT 54, P9, 28 P.3d 
669 (second alteration in original) (quotations 
and citations omitted). 
[*P15] The Osguthorpes also argue the district 
court erred in not ordering joinder of Stephen 
and the Canyons. We review the district court's 
"rule 19 determination under an abuse of 
discretion standard." Grand County v. Rogers, 
2002 UT 25, P27, 44 P.3d 734. However, the 
district court's "interpretation of... rule [19] is a 
question of law that we review for correctness." 
Brown v. Glover, 2000 UT 89, PI5, 16 P.3d 
540. n2 
n2 The Osguthorpes additionally 
argue the district court exceeded its 
discretion in failing to grant their second 
motion to amend. However, they fail to 
explain why the district court exceeded 
its discretion. They instead appear to ask 
this court to order the district court to 
allow amendment on remand. As Smith 
correctly notes, the Osguthorpes have the 
option to seek amendment on remand. 
See Call v. West Jordan City, 727 P.2d 
180, 181 (Utah 1986) (noting pleadings 
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may be amended after remand "within 
the sound discretion of the [district] court 
so long as they do not cover issues 




I. Is the Dissolution Agreement 
Enforceable? 
[*P16] The Osguthorpes raise a number of 
issues in contending the district court erred in 
enforcing the dissolution agreement. We 
consider each issue but conclude the district 
court did not err in concluding the dissolution 
agreement is enforceable. 
A. Consideration of Parol Evidence in 
Determining the Dissolution Agreement is 
Integrated 
[*P17] The parol evidence rule "operates in 
the absence of fraud to exclude [prior and] 
contemporaneous conversations, statements, or 
representations offered for the purpose of 
varying or adding to the terms of an integrated 
contract." Union Bank v. Swenson, 707 P.2d 
663, 665 (Utah 1985) (emphasis omitted). "An 
agreement is integrated where the parties 
thereto adopt a writing or writings as the final 
and complete expression of the agreement." Eie 
v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 638 P.2d 1190, 1194 
(Utah 1981) (quotations and citation omitted). 
[*P18] "[A] court must first determine 
whether the writing was intended by the parties 
to be an integration. In resolving this 
preliminary question of fact, parol evidence, 
indeed any relevant [***9] evidence, is 
admissible." Union Bank, 707 P.2d at 665 
(emphasis added). However, to preserve the 
integrity of written contracts, we apply "a 
rebuttable presumption that a writing which on 
its face appears to be an integrated agreement 
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is what it appears to be." Id.; see also Terry's 
Sales, Inc. v. Vander Veur II, 618 P.2d 29, 32 
(Utah 1980) ("Where parties have various 
claims and obligations to each other, and have 
had a discussion about resolving their disputes 
which results in a written [**858] agreement 
signed by them, it is generally to be assumed 
that their disputes were merged into the written 
agreement."). Further, a district court is not 
precluded from ruling that an agreement is 
integrated in granting a motion for summary 
judgment. If the "contract terms are complete, 
clear, and unambiguous [, they can] be 
interpreted by the judge on a motion for 
summary judgment." Webb v. R.O.A. Gen., 
Inc., 804 P.2d 547, 551 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) 
(quotations and citation omitted). We cannot 
say the district court erred in determining from 
the unambiguous terms of the dissolution 
agreement that it is integrated. n3 
n3 It is unclear whether the district 
court considered the parol evidence 
offered by the Osguthorpes in 
determining that the dissolution 
agreement is integrated. However, even 
if we were to conclude that the parol 
evidence was admissible to determine if 
the dissolution agreement is integrated 
and the court erred in not considering it, 
we conclude any error was harmless. The 
parol evidence does not establish that the 
dissolution agreement is not integrated. 
In his affidavits, Osguthorpe attested 
that in 1966, he and Smith orally agreed 
to dissolve the partnership. Thereafter, he 
tendered $ 50,000 to Smith who accepted 
the payment. A few weeks later, Smith's 
attorney contacted Osguthorpe to sign 
the dissolution agreement, which 
Osguthorpe reviewed. Osguthorpe also 
attested that the $ 50,000 he paid Smith 
was equal to or greater than the then 
current market value of Smith's 
partnership interest and Osguthorpe 
received no consideration for signing the 
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dissolution agreement. This testimony is 
not persuasive on the issue of integration. 
[***10] 
[*P19] The dissolution agreement provides 
that the parties "now desire to settle all of the 
rights between them." (Emphasis added.) 
Further, the agreement requires Osguthorpe to 
pay $ 50,000 to Smith within thirty days of the 
date of the agreement and "upon payment in 
full" requires Smith to execute and deliver 
assignments, deeds, and bills of sale necessary 
to convey his interest in the partnership 
businesses. Each party also agrees to "release 
and discharge" the other from all claims arising 
out of the partnership. We conclude the 
unambiguous language establishes that the 
dissolution agreement is integrated. 
B. Consideration for the Dissolution 
Agreement 
[*P20] Next, the Osguthorpes argue that 
although in the dissolution agreement Smith 
purports to convey his interest in the disputed 
property, Smith had nothing to convey as 
Osguthorpe was at all times the owner of the 
property. Thus, they argue Smith's promise to 
sell subject to a reservation when he had no 
interest to sell does not "suffice for 
consideration." 
[*P21] The dissolution agreement provides: 
Except as hereinafter reserved to [Smith], 
[Smith] agrees to sell to [Osguthorpe] all 
[***11] of [Smith's] right, title, interest and 
estate in and to all partnership assets, and 
[Osguthorpe] agrees to purchase from [Smith] 
all of his said right, title, interest and estate in 
and to all partnership assets upon the following 
terms and conditions, to-wit: 
1. The partnership assets and properties 
covered hereby shall include: 
....(g) In addition to the above described 
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property, [Smith] agrees to sell to 
[Osguthorpe], his interest in the following 
described real property located in Summit 
County, Utah, subject, however, to the 
reservation of interests therein by [Smith] as 
hereinafter specifically set forth: 
[property description in metes and bounds]. 
(Emphasis added.) 
[*P22] The district court concluded the 
disputed property was a partnership asset based 
upon this declaration. We agree. Subparagraph 
(l)(g) falls under the paragraph providing that 
Osguthorpe "agrees to purchase ... all 
partnership assets upon the following terms and 
conditions," and paragraph (1) providing that 
"the partnership assets and properties covered 
hereby shall include," and then listing the 
partnership properties. (Emphasis added.) In 
subparagraph [***12] (l)(g), Smith agrees to 
sell "his interest in the following described real 
property." (Emphasis added.) Smith and 
Osguthorpe were agreeing that certain 
properties were [**859] partnership properties 
to the exclusion of other properties. n4 
n4 The Osguthorpes argue the district 
court erred in refusing to consider parol 
evidence offered to support their 
contention that Smith's promise to sell 
the disputed property was illusory. Smith 
responds that because the dissolution 
agreement unambiguously declares that 
the disputed property was partnership 
property and Smith had an interest in 
such property, parol evidence is 
inadmissible. The Utah Supreme Court 
has recognized that parol evidence is 
admissible to show lack or want of 
consideration, see Union Bank v. 
Swenson, 707 P.2d 663, 665 (Utah 
1985), and failure of consideration, see 
Nielsen v. MFT Leasing, 656 P.2d 454, 
456 (Utah 1982). But see Last Chance 
Ranch, Co. v. Erickson, 82 Utah 475, 25 
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P.2d 952, 958 (1933) ("If the 
consideration stated appears as a clear 
and unambiguous statement of part of the 
agreement, representing an actual 
contractual term and something more 
than a mere formal requisite, such a term 
of the contract must be regarded in the 
same light as any other material term of 
the contract and extrinsic evidence to 
vary or contradict it is inadmissible[.]" 
(Quotations and citation omitted.)). In his 
affidavit, Osguthorpe attested that he 
never transferred nor intended to transfer 
ownership of the disputed property to 
Smith or the partnership, nor is there any 
signed, delivered, or recorded deed doing 
the same. However, Utah's Partnership 
Act acknowledges that property may be 
conveyed to a partnership without 
transferring title. See Utah Code Ann. § 
§ 48-1-5, 48-1-7 (1998). Additionally, 
the dissolution agreement was recorded. 
We thus conclude that even considering 
the extrinsic evidence, there is no 
material issue of fact that precludes 
summary judgment. Our conclusion is 
further supported by the fact that 
Osguthorpe's wife signed the dissolution 
agreement under the clause providing, "I 
... agree that any interest that I may have 
in and to the [disputed property] shall be 
subject to the provisions of said 
paragraph 1 (g)." 
r***i3i 
[*P23] The Osguthorpes argue the declaration 
alone is insufficient as a matter of law to 
establish that Smith had an interest in the 
disputed property because Smith was required 
to prove a conveyance, separate from the 
dissolution agreement, by Osguthorpe to Smith 
or their partnership that complied with the 
statute of frauds. 
[*P24] To satisfy the statute of frauds, "all 
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that is required is that the interest be granted or 
declared by a writing subscribed by the party to 
be charged." Guinand v. Walton, 22 Utah 2d 
196, 450 P.2d 467, 469 (1969) (concluding 
letter stating partner was entitled to ten percent 
interest in partnership assets, consisting of 
leaseholds and interest in lands, satisfied statute 
of frauds) (emphasis added). The district court 
ruled that because the dissolution agreement 
declared the disputed property to be partnership 
property and it was signed by Osguthorpe, the 
party to be charged, the statute of frauds was 
satisfied. We agree with the district court that 
the dissolution agreement suffices to show that 
Smith had an interest in the property and 
therefore the dissolution agreement is 
supported by consideration. n5 
n5 The Osguthorpes also argue 
Smith's promise to sell some undefined 
"interest" in the property fails for lack of 
specificity under the statute of frauds. 
"[A] real property interest may be 
transferred through [a deed or] other 
documents and memoranda revealing an 
intent to transfer an interest in real 
property." Warburton v. Virginia Beach 
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 899 P.2d 779, 
781 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). Given that 
Smith promised to sell his entire interest 
in the partnership property, we conclude 
the statute of frauds is satisfied. 
r***j4] 
II. Is the Reservation of a Share of the 
Lease Payments an Unreasonable Restraint on 
Alienation? 
[*P25] The Osguthorpes argue Smith's 
reservation of an interest in the sale and lease 
payments is void as an unreasonable restraint 
on alienation. Smith responds the reservation of 
a share of the lease payments is not a restraint 
on alienation but is merely an agreed upon 
method of splitting up the profits when the 
2002 UT App 361, *; 58 P.3d 854, **; 
459 Utah Adv. Rep. 22; 2002 
disputed property is leased. The reservation 
provides in relevant part: 
In the event, however, that [Osguthorpe] or 
his successor or successors in interest, during 
the lifetime of the survivor of [Smith] and 
[Osguthorpe], plus twenty-one (21) years, in a 
good faith transaction, shall sell the property, 
or any part thereof at a price exceeding Twenty 
Dollars ($ 20.00) per acre, plus the depreciated 
cost of any fencing that [Osguthorpe] may have 
caused to be done on the property, then [Smith] 
shall share equally with [Osguthorpe] in the 
sales price paid over Twenty Dollars ($ 20.00) 
per acre, plus said depreciated fencing cost, and 
if, during said period of time he, or his 
successor or successors in interest in the 
property shall lease all or any part of [***15] 
the property, for any period of [**860] time 
commencing during said retained interest 
period, at a price in excess of $ 1.60 per acre 
per year, [Smith] shall share equally in the 
excess rental over the $ 1.60 per acre per year. 
[*P26] In Redd v. Western Savings & Loan 
Co., 646 P.2d 761 (Utah 1982), the Utah 
Supreme Court recognized two types of 
restraints on alienation, direct and indirect. See 
id. at 764 (citing Restatement of Property § 
404 (1944)). A direct restraint 
"is an attempt by an otherwise effective 
conveyance or contract to cause a later 
conveyance (a) to be void; or (b) to impose 
contractual liability on the one who makes the 
later conveyance when such liability results 
from a breach of an agreement not to convey; 
or (c) to terminate or subject to termination all 
or a part of the property interest conveyed." 
Id. at 762 n.l (quoting Restatement of 
Property § 404). Traditionally, direct restraints 
have been held to be void. See Page v. Page, 
15 Utah 2d 432, 394 P.2d 612, 613 (1964). We 
agree with the district court that the reservation 
of a share of the lease payments is not a direct 
restraint. [***16] 
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[*P27] "An indirect restraint on alienation 
arises when an attempt is made to accomplish 
some purpose other than the restraint of 
alienability, but with the incidental result that 
the instrument, if valid, would restrain practical 
alienability." Redd, 646 P.2d at 764 (quotations 
and citation omitted); see also Restatement 
(Third) of Prop.: Servitudes § 3.5 (1998) ("An 
otherwise valid servitude is valid even if it 
indirectly restrains alienation by limiting the 
use that can be made of the property, by 
reducing the amount realizable by the owner on 
sale or other transfer of the property, or by 
otherwise reducing the value of the property."). 
In Redd, the supreme court noted that an 
indirect restraint will "generally [be] upheld 
and enforced ... if it is found reasonably 
necessary to protect a justifiable or legitimate 
interest of the parties." 646 P.2d at 764. 
[*P28] The pivotal issue in the present case is 
whether the provision that Osguthorpe share 
the lease payments with Smith restrains 
practical alienability and thus is an indirect 
restraint on alienation. n6 Utah appellate courts 
have not considered this issue. However, 
[***17] Holiday Out In America at St. Lucie, 
Inc. v. Bowes, 285 So. 2d 63 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1973), is instructive. In that case, 
purchasers of condominium units brought an 
action to void, as an unreasonable restraint, a 
condominium declaration provision that gave 
the developer the exclusive right to rent the 
condominium units to the general public when 
the same were not occupied by the owners. See 
id. at 64. The provision required the developer 
to remit fifty percent of the rent to the owners 
to help pay for the units. See id. The Florida 
Court of Appeals concluded there was no 
restraint on alienation. See id. The court 
explained, "that the property may be less 
desirable (and hence less valuable) than would 
be the case if not subject to the rental 
restrictions ... simply does not constitute a 
restraint on alienation." Id. 
n6 The Osguthorpes rely on LaFond 
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v. Rumler, 226 Mich. App. 447, 574 
N.W.2d 40 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997); White 
v. White, 105 N.J. Super. 184, 251 A.2d 
470 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1969); 
Dunlop v. Dunlop, 144 Va. 297,132 S.E. 
351 (Va. 1926); and Girard v. Myers, 39 
Wn. App. 577, 694 P.2d 678 (Wash. Ct. 
App. 1985). However, these cases 
address distinguishable provisions 
requiring grantees to share in proceeds 
upon the sale of property, traditionally 
referred to as "quarter sales." The 
"quarter sale" provision in the dissolution 
agreement is not at issue in the present 
case. 
Moreover, although quarter sales 
traditionally have been considered void 
as unreasonable restraints on alienation, 
see, e.g., United States v. 397.51 Acres 
of Land, 692 F.2d 688, 691-92 (10th Cir. 
1982), the more modern view, according 
to the Restatement (Third) of Property, is 
that quarter sales are valid indirect 
restraints on alienation even though they 
reduce "the amount realizable by the 
owner on sale or other transfer of 
property, or by otherwise reducing the 
value of the property." Restatement 
(Third) of Prop.: Servitudes § 3.5 
(1998). This is because "modern 
financing practices have led to 
acceptance of arrangements in which 
land buyers agree to share future 
appreciation with both sellers and 
lenders. Under [section 3.5 of the 
Restatement (Third) of Property], these 
arrangements are not invalid if there is 
some rational justification for requiring 
the grantee to share the proceeds with 
another." Id. § 3.5 cmt. c. 
[***18] 
[*P29] Even if we were to hold the rent 
sharing provision in the present case is an 
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indirect restraint, we would conclude it can 
[**861] be enforced. Significantly, Redd was 
decided before section 3.5 of the Restatement 
(Third) of Property was adopted. Section 3.5 
drops the requirement that an indirect restraint 
be reasonable, requiring only a rational 
justification for the restraint. See Restatement 
(Third) of Prop.: Servitudes § 3.5 cmt. a. We 
conclude under either the Redd reasonableness 
test or the more modern rational justification 
test, the reservation is not invalid. 
[*P30] Kerley v. Nu-West, Inc., 158 Ariz. 
344, 762 P.2d 631 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988), is 
helpful. In that case, two landowners sold 
fifteen acres of their interest in a subdivision to 
a developer, subject to a reservation of ten 
percent of the gross sales price from the first 
sale of each improved parcel, and subject to a 
provision requiring the developer to develop 
and sell the land. 762 P.2d at 632-33. The 
reservation was a covenant running with the 
land and was binding on successive owners 
until the amount due on the first sale was paid. 
See762 P.2d at 633. The sellers [***19] and 
developer also agreed the sellers could 
repurchase the land that had not been 
developed or resold. See id. In considering 
whether the restraint was reasonable, the 
Arizona Court of Appeals considered whether: 
"1. the one imposing the restraint has some 
interest in the land which he is seeking to 
protect by the enforcement of the restraint; 2. 
the restraint is limited in duration; 3. the 
enforcement of the restraint accomplishes a 
worthwhile purpose; 4. the type of conveyances 
prohibited are ones not likely to be employed to 
any substantial degree by the one restrained; 5. 
the number of persons to whom alienation is 
prohibited is small; 6. the one upon whom the 
restraint is imposed is a charity." 
762 P.2d at 634 (quoting Restatement of 
Property § 406 cmt. i (1944)). 
[*P31] In upholding the restraint, the Arizona 
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Court of Appeals noted the sellers retained an 
interest in the adjoining land. See 762 P.2d at 
635. The court then emphasized the "whole 
purpose of the agreement was to develop and 
sell land—the very antithesis of the purpose of 
those practices that gave rise to statutes and 
decisions [traditionally] forbidding quarter 
sales and unreasonable restraints [***20] on 
alienation." Id. The court further emphasized 
the developer knew when he bargained for the 
agreement that he had to project his profit or 
loss plus the ten percent reservation on the 
price of the property. See id. The court also 
emphasized that although "as written, the 
obligation to pay money [was] unlimited as to 
time ... the law ... implied that it [would] be 
carried out within a reasonable time." Id. Thus, 
although the power to trigger the obligation to 
pay the ten percent was within the developer's 
control, if the sellers took no legal action to see 
that the spirit of the agreement was enforced, 
"laches [might] foreclose [their] right to receive 
the ten percent payment" upon resale. 762 P.2d 
at 636. 
[*P32] In the present case, Enoch Richard 
Smith alleges his father's justification for the 
reservation was to allow him to participate in 
the disputed property's future increase in value. 
Further, the record shows the reservation did 
not prevent alienation twice—to the family 
partnership and to the Canyons. In fact, the 
Osguthorpes leased the property for twenty-
eight years and it has been improved. Thus, we 
conclude the reservation of a share of [***21] 
the lease payments is enforceable. 
III. Does the Dissolution Agreement Entitle 
Smith to Share in the Lease Payments 
Although the Osguthorpes Use Portions of the 
Disputed Property for Grazing? 
[*P33] The Osguthorpes assert the dissolution 
agreement provides that they do not have to 
share the lease payments with Smith so long as 
they use the disputed property for grazing in 
connection with their sheep and cattle 
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operations. 
[*P34] The dissolution agreement provides: 
So long as [Osguthorpe] shall use said real 
property as grazing lands in connection with 
his operation of a sheep or cattle business, 
[Osguthorpe] shall have the right to the 
possession and use of the property without 
compensation to [Smith], but he shall pay the 
taxes and any expense of maintaining the 
property. In the event, however, that 
[Osguthorpe] or his successor [**862] or 
successors in interest ... shall lease all or any 
part of the property, for any period of time 
commencing during said retained interest 
period, at a price in excess of $ 1.60 per acre 
per year, [Smith] shall share equally in the 
excess rental over the $ 1.60 per acre per year. 
(Emphasis added.) 
[*P35] [***22] The Osguthorpes allege that 
Smith's counsel assured Osguthorpe that the 
dissolution agreement would only require him 
to share lease payments if he ceased using the 
property for grazing. We agree with the district 
court that the Osguthorpes' allegation is 
contrary to the unambiguous plain language of 
the agreement and that Smith is entitled to 
share in the lease payments even though the 
Osguthorpes continue to use part of the 
disputed property for grazing. 
IV. Does the Dissolution Agreement Entitle 
Smith to Share in the Lease Payments? 
[*P36] The Osguthorpes argue that because 
the lease does not grant the Canyons an 
exclusive right of possession, Smith is not 
entitled to share in the lease payments under 
the dissolution agreement. They maintain the 
lease grants a nonexclusive easement because 
they retain the right to possess, improve, and 
control the property. 
[*P37] The dissolution agreement provides 
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that Smith is entitled to share in lease payments 
if the Osguthorpes lease "any part" of the 
disputed property. The district court ruled the 
lease was for a leasehold interest. The court 
emphasized that the lease is titled "Lease 
Agreement" and identifies the Osguthorpes 
[***23] as the lessors and the Canyons as the 
lessee. The court further emphasized that the 
lease requires the Canyons to pay "rent." Thus, 
the court ruled the dissolution agreement 
requires the Osguthorpes to share the lease 
payments. The Osguthorpes argue the district 
court elevated form over substance in focusing 
on the nomenclature "lease." 
[*P38] "A lease conveys an interest in land 
and transfers possession." Keller v. Southwood 
N. Med. Pavilion, Inc., 959 P.2d 102, 107 
(Utah 1998) (quotations and citation omitted). 
While a leasehold transfers exclusive 
possession, see id., an easement is also an 
interest in land of another, although for a 
particular purpose, see Warburton v. Virginia 
Beach Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 899 P.2d 779, 
781 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); see also Crane v. 
Crane, 683 P.2d 1062, 1066 (Utah 1984) 
(recognizing commercial easements in gross as 
alienable property interests). We conclude the 
district court properly considered the lease 
language, although it is not determinative. We 
further conclude the dissolution agreement 
allows Smith to share in the lease payments, 
even if the Canyons' interest is an easement, 
[***24] as the dissolution agreement entitles 
Smith to share in the lease payments if the 
Osguthorpes lease "any part" of the disputed 
property and the agreement is silent as to 
exclusive possession. n7 
n7 The Osguthorpes also argue the 
lease grants only a license to the 
Canyons. A license "is the permission or 
authority to engage in a particular act or 
series of acts upon the land of another 
without possessing an interest therein." 
Keller v. Southwood N. Med. Pavilion, 
Inc., 959 P.2d 102, 107 (Utah 1998) 
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(quotations and citation omitted). The 
lease grants the Canyons the right to 
specific portions of the disputed property 
and it does so for twenty-eight years at a 
fixed annual rent. Although the 
Osguthorpes retain the right to improve 
the disputed property, they could not, 
under the original lease or first 
amendment, interfere with the Canyons' 
operations and cannot, under the second 
amendment, unreasonably interfere with 
the Canyons' winter operations. Thus, the 
d i s t r i c t cou r t a p p r o p r i a t e l y 
acknowledged the Canyons has 
possession rights under the lease. 
Moreover, the lease allows the Canyons 
to make certain improvements to the 
property and the Canyons has in fact 
constructed and maintained ski lifts, 
roads, trails, and facilities on the 
property. Given that the Canyons has the 
right to run its operations with limited 
interference and to construct roads and 
trails, the tenancy term, and the fixed 
annual rent under the lease, we conclude 
the lease involves more than "permission 
or authority to engage in a particular act 
or series of acts upon the land." Id. 
[***25] 
V. Do Issues of Material Fact in Regard to 
Allocation of the Lease Payments Preclude 
Summary Judgment on Damages? 
[*P39] The Osguthorpes maintain the district 
court erred in ruling that the entire payment 
due under the lease and the amendments is for 
use of the disputed property because the 
[**863] lease parties' deposition testimony and 
affidavits establish that the majority of the 
lease payment is for Stephen Osguthorpe's 
(Stephen) personal services. 
[*P40] The district court ruled the lease and 
the amendments are integrated. However, it is 
unclear from the district court's ruling whether 
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the court considered the parol evidence offered 
by the Osguthorpes in so ruling. The court also 
ruled that any "side oral agreement" for 
services by Stephen violated the statute of 
frauds. 
[*P41] In first determining whether the lease 
and the amendments are integrated, the district 
court was required to consider "parol evidence, 
indeed any relevant evidence," Union Bank v. 
Swenson, 707 P.2d 663, 665 (Utah 1985) 
(emphasis added), "showing the circumstances 
under which [they were] made and the purpose 
for which the instruments [were] executed." Eie 
v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 638 P.2d 1190, 1194 
(Utah 1981) [***26] (quotations and citation 
omitted). However, to preserve the integrity of 
written contracts, our courts "presume that a 
writing which on its face appears to be an 
integrated agreement is what it appears to be." 
Union Bank, 707 P.2d at 664; see also Terry's 
Sales, Inc. v. Vander Veur II, 618 P.2d 29, 32 
(Utah 1980) ("Where parties have various 
claims and obligations to each other, and have 
had a discussion about resolving their disputes 
which results in a written agreement signed by 
them, it is generally to be assumed that their 
disputes were merged into the written 
agreement."). Further, a district court is not 
precluded from ruling that a contract is 
integrated in granting a motion for summary 
judgment. If the "contract terms are complete, 
clear, and unambiguous [, they can] be 
interpreted by the judge on a motion for 
summary judgment." Webb v. R.O.A. Gen., 
Inc., 804 P.2d 547, 551 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) 
(quotations and citation omitted). 
[*P42] The initial lease makes no reference to 
services, nor does it include any language that 
even ambiguously alludes to services. The first 
amendment provides that Stephen is to approve 
[***27] construction of certain roads and trails 
and the Canyons "will include the Osguthorpes 
in their master planning process." It also 
provides the lease parties are to "work together 
in good faith" and "maintain open 
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communications." 
[*P43] The Osguthorpes offered affidavits 
and deposition testimony that Osguthorpe and 
Stephen met with the Canyons after it 
succeeded to Wolf Mountain's interest in the 
lease. The Osguthorpes and the Canyons 
allegedly orally agreed that Stephen would 
assist the Canyons with obtaining permits and 
with the development of the disputed property. 
The Osguthorpes also offered two checks from 
the Canyons for the annual lease payment. The 
1999 check listed Stephen as the payee. 
[*P44] In his deposition, Blaise Carrig 
(Carrig), the Canyons' director, testified that 
because of time constraints and the parties' 
relationship, the first amendment was brief and 
does not include a detailed description of the 
personal services. Carrig further testified that 
use of the property was worthless without the 
Osguthorpes' support in obtaining permits and 
"consultation to make the whole operation and 
planning ... work." Carrig also testified that the 
lease [***28] amendment language that the 
Canyons and the Osguthorpes agree to "work 
together in good faith" and "maintain open 
communications" establishes that part of the 
lease payment is for services. 
[*P45] We cannot determine from the record 
whether the district court considered the 
offered parol evidence to determine as a 
threshold matter whether the lease and the 
amendments are an integrated agreement. See 
Colonial Leasing Co. of New England, Inc. v. 
Larsen Bros. Constr. Co., 731 P.2d 483, 486 
(Utah 1986) ("Because the parol evidence rule 
applies only if the writing was intended by the 
parties to represent the full and complete 
agreement of the parties, the [district] court 
must first determine whether the writing was 
intended to be an integrated agreement."). We 
also cannot say as we did with the dissolution 
agreement that the terms of the informal lease 
and amendments are "complete, clear, and 
unambiguous." We conclude the parol evidence 
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offered by the Osguthorpes was relevant to 
whether the lease and the amendments 
constitute an integrated agreement. We also 
conclude that if [**864] the district court 
determines after considering this parol 
evidence that the lease [***29] and the 
amendments are not an integrated agreement, 
then there is a material issue of fact as to 
damages. We therefore remand for the court to 
consider the parol evidence or to make clear 
that it considered the parol evidence in ruling 
that the lease and the amendments are 
integrated. If the court did not consider the 
parol evidence, the court must consider such 
evidence to determine whether the lease and 
the amendments are an integrated agreement to 
pay exclusively for the use of the disputed 
property or whether the lease parties also have 
an agreement for services and the appropriate 
allocation of damages. 
[*P46] On remand the district court should 
make clear it considered the parol evidence in 
ruling the lease and the amendments are 
integrated or it should take evidence to 
determine if the lease and the amendments are 
integrated. The district court should determine 
based on the lease and the amendment terms, 
testimony of the parties to the lease and the 
amendments, and the circumstances 
surrounding their execution if they are 
integrated. Even if the evidence offered on 
remand "is uncontroverted, [the district] court 
is free to disregard such [evidence] if it finds 
[***30] the evidence 'self-serving and not 
credible."' Glauser Storage, L.L.C., v. Smedley, 
2001 UT App 141, P24, 27 P.3d 565. Thus, we 
note that even if the parties' testimony is 
uncontroverted, the court may determine under 
the circumstances the lease and the 
amendments are integrated, cf. Webb, 804 
P.2d at 551, and that the lease payments are for 
use of the disputed property not for services. If 
the court determines the lease and the 
amendments are not integrated, then summary 
judgment would not be appropriate as there 
would be disputed issues of fact. The court then 
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must ultimately hear testimony to determine if 
there is a valid, enforceable agreement—e.g., 
which is not barred by the statute of frauds and 
which is not unenforceable for lack of 
definiteness~to apply part of the annual lease 
payments as payment for personal services. If 
such an agreement exists, the court should also 
determine what portion of the lease payments is 
for use of the disputed property, determine 
what portion is for services, and establish 
damages based thereon. 
VI. Did the District Court Err by not 
Ordering Joinder of Stephen and the Canyons? 
[*P47] In essence, the [***31] Osguthorpes 
argue the district court erred by inviting, rattier 
than ordering, joinder of Stephen and the 
Canyons because they are indispensable 
parties. Under Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, a party must be joined if that 
party is necessary and it is feasible to join that 
party. See Utah R. Civ. P. 19. "The underlying 
purpose of rule 19 requiring joinder of 
necessary parties is '"to protect the interests of 
absent persons as well as those already before 
the court from multiple litigation or 
inconsistent judicial determinations.'"" Grand 
County v. Rogers, 2002 UT 25, P28, 44 P.3d 
734 (quoting Landes v. Capital City Bank, 795 
P.2d 1127, 1130 (Utah 1990)) (other citation 
omitted). 
[*P48] "Under rule 19, the [district] court 
must first determine whether a party is 
necessary." 2002 UT 25 at P29. A party is 
necessary if: 
"(1) in his absence complete relief cannot 
be accorded among those already parties, or (2) 
he claims an interest relating to the subject of 
the action and is so situated that the disposition 
of the action in his absence may (I) as a 
practical matter impair or impede his ability to 
protect that interest or (ii) [***32] leave any 
of the persons already parties subject to a 
substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, 
or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason 
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of his claimed interest." no longer perform services. 
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2002 UT 25 at P28 (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 
19(a)). If the court concludes a party is 
necessary, "the court must next consider 
whether joinder of the necessary party is 
feasible." 2002 UT 25 at P29. If joinder is 
feasible, the necessary party '"shall be joined.'" 
Id. (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 19(a)). 
[*P49] The district court concluded that 
although Stephen and the Canyons did not have 
an interest in Smith's action generally, they did 
have an interest in the court's ruling that the 
lease payments were for use of the disputed 
property not for personal [**865] services. 
The court then invited Stephen and the 
Canyons to file memoranda in opposition to 
Smith's motion for summary judgment in 
regard to damages. Stephen filed a 
memorandum in opposition and an affidavit. 
The Canyons declined to do the same. 
[*P50] In their opening brief, the Osguthorpes 
fail to discuss specific facts showing how 
Stephen or the Canyons, "based on the criteria 
set forth in rule 19(a), [are] necessary parties to 
this action. [***33] " Green v. Louder, 2001 
UT 62, P44, 29 P.3d 638. Nor do they explain 
why the authorities they cite compel this court 
to reverse the district court. 
[*P51] "Without more, delay is not a proper 
reason to deny joinder under rule 19." LePet, 
Inc. v. Mower, 872 P.2d 470, 473 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1994). However, in this case, Stephen 
was a party to the litigation as a member of the 
family partnership; yet, Osguthorpe and the 
family partnership did not seek joinder until 
after Smith's motion for summary judgment on 
damages had been granted. We also disagree 
that Stephen's ability to protect his interest is 
impaired. In his affidavit, he attested that 
Osguthorpe allocates the lease payments. There 
is no evidence that he has not received any 
payment due him, although the record includes 
a letter to the Canyons indicating Stephen will 
[*P52] Further, rule 19 allows joinder where 
there is a "substantial risk" of inconsistent 
obligations. Utah R. Civ. P. 19(a). Here, 
according to Stephen's affidavit, Osguthorpe 
allocates the lease payments. Arguably, 
Stephen's interest and the Canyons' interest in 
the district court's ruling [***34] in regard to 
the lease payments are identical—they both 
share a concern that services are a significant 
part of the lease payments. Although the 
Canyons is not bound by the district court's 
decision, it seems likely that an action by the 
Canyons against Stephen for services would be 
unsuccessful. Cf. Boczon v. Northwestern 
Elevator Co., 652 F. Supp. 1482, 1486 (E.D. 
Wis. 1987) (recognizing "no substantial risk of 
incurring inconsistent obligations exists where 
there is only a risk of a frivolous lawsuit, or 
where the absent party has no cause of action 
against parties already named" (citation 
omitted)). Thus, we cannot say the district 
court erred in not ordering joinder of Stephen 
and the Canyons in the first proceeding. 
However, we note the issues presented in 
regard to the integration of the lease and 
damages on remand may well require a 
different result. 
CONCLUSION 
[*P53] We conclude the dissolution 
agreement is integrated and enforceable. We 
further conclude Smith is entitled to share in 
the lease payments even though the 
Osguthorpes still use the disputed property for 
grazing and the Canyons' possession of the 
same may not be exclusive. However, the 
[***35] district court was required to consider 
extrinsic evidence in determining as a threshold 
matter whether the lease and the amendments 
are integrated. We therefore reverse in part and 
remand for consideration of this evidence and 
for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Judith M. Billings, 
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